Prevention economies in Kenya: Peace, Power & Pragmatism?

PREVENTION AND CONFLICT

Prevention economies in Kenya: Peace, Power and Pragmatism?

While international security interests continue to hijack the ‘triple nexus’, local CSOs have used Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) to allocate and redirect resources to their own needs, secure their mission in the face of a shrinking civil society space, and protect themselves from direct security interventions.

Golden Brown (iStock)

The Emergence of the ‘Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism’ Agenda

“Conflict prevention” is an umbrella term for a variety of interventions in the peacebuilding field that aim at addressing factors that could lead to violent conflict. SDG 16 in the UN 2030 agenda makes an important contribution to the realm of conflict prevention with the target goal to “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.” After years of hard counter-terrorism strategies, preventive measures to address the root causes of radicalization have also gained traction in the Global War on Terror. The United States, supported by the United Nations, have played a central role in this paradigm shift and the introduction of the concept ‘Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism’ (P/CVE), which replaced the dominant notion of ‘Counter-Terrorism’ (CT) in policy spaces in 2015. P/CVE has since become the globally accepted security strategy to address violent extremism, by underscoring a whole-of-society approach, as well as the localization of the fight against terrorism. While P/CVE is very much a security strategy, the agenda is now also closely linked to SDG 16 through the emphasis on strengthening civil society and government institutions, building social cohesion and resilience, addressing local grievances and respecting human rights. At the core of this union between P/CVE as a security strategy and peacebuilding lies the concept of ‘human security’, which is defined by the UNDP as ‘freedom of want’ and ‘freedom of fear’. ‘Human security’ focuses on the individual grievances that may incite violence. Consequently, many security approaches are no longer solely based on military power, but include humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding initiatives. Within this vein, CSOs have thus become integral to the realization of the agenda. As a result, critics argue that P/CVE has securitized and co-opted the civil society space, thereby forging a dangerous liaison between security actors and CSOs.

Securitization of the Civil Society Space in Kenya

In the first years, after its global adoption in 2015, the P/CVE agenda was implemented through National Action Plans (NAPs) with great enthusiasm from the international community. Particularly, the United States supported its allies around the world in the adoption of the agenda through technical assistance and donor funding. Kenya is one of the US’s main strategic allies in the Global War on Terror in Africa and has been at the forefront of adopting the P/CVE agenda in the last 7 years. While donors decreased their funding through COVID-19 and the presidential election in 2022, P/CVE is still one of the main donor priorities in Kenya to this day. Since the introduction of P/CVE in 2016 through a National Action Plan (NAP), many CSOs have geared towards the implementation of P/CVE programs to access funding for their programs. The international donor industry, which is heavily influenced by security interests in the Horn of Africa, has thus very much impacted the civil society space in Kenya. As the Kenyan government considers violent extremism a national security issue, every organization that implements P/CVE must report to the National Center for Counterterrorism (NCTC) under the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) since a 2019 amendment. CSOs therefore have to report to the authorities about P/CVE programs, which can include sensitive information about the program participants. As a consequence, local communities have accused CSOs of espionage and surveillance, thereby criticizing the alignment of aid programs with security interventions. While the securitization of the civil society space in Kenya through the integration of security strategies into aid programs in the name of prevention has certainly led to many trust issues between CSOs and local communities, the question of agency and resistance of CSOs is central in understanding P/CVE in Kenya. CSOs are subject to complex negotiations between international security agendas, funding scarcity, and local agency. I will briefly discuss the entanglement of the security-oriented P/CVE agenda in three key areas in the aid architecture: human rights (1), humanitarian and development aid (2), and peacebuilding (3).

The Entanglement of P/CVE with the Aid Architecture

In the aftermath of heavy security crackdowns against Muslim communities after the Westgate mall attack in 2013 and counter-terrorism operations along the coast, Kenyan human rights organizations were very vocal about the human rights violations including forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings committed by Kenyan security forces and brought international attention onto the situation. As a response, the government listed two leading human rights organizations as terrorist entities which resulted in the freezing of their bank accounts. After a legal battle the court finally ruled the accusation as unjust and commanded the unfreezing of assets. Nevertheless, the incident sent a clear message to human rights organizations nation-wide. It is therefore, perhaps, surprising how many human rights organizations are currently actively implementing P/CVE programs despite of the previously mentioned issues. While the P/CVE agenda commits to a human rights-based approach to preventing violent extremism, the often-times close involvement of security forces in the implementation of P/CVE also endangers the integrity of CSOs. I would argue, however, that P/CVE can and should also be understood as part of a pragmatic response by human rights organizations that engage in a difficult balancing act between shining light onto human rights violations and their own security. The close relationship with the government and security forces in the implementation of P/CVE seems to allow human rights organizations to expose certain incidents without feeling immediate repercussions. Additionally, at the coast, CSOs established a consortium to protect each other from similar accusations. Human rights organizations and other CSOs also contest the 2019 amendment of POTA that obliges all organizations that implement P/CVE to report information to the NCTC. They are thus forced to find a pragmatic path between dialogue with the security forces and protection of their own work.

Humanitarian and development programs are frequently also part of P/CVE responses in Kenya. Especially in the North-Eastern region of Kenya, humanitarian and development interventions converge with security strategies to tackle violent extremism. The climate crisis has led to the worst droughts and food emergency situation in forty years. The redirection of funding channels to European countries through the Ukraine war and global wheat price crisis also partly contribute to the lack of funding to address humanitarian needs in the region. Additionally, foreign actors often prioritize other countries as they consider Kenya as a middle-income country. Since P/CVE continues to be a funding priority for many donors in the North-Eastern region of Kenya, many local CSOs apply for P/CVE funding to allocate resources and later redirect them to humanitarian assistance programs. Local CSOs, in asserting their agency, therefore also take advantage of the P/CVE industry to access funding that they would otherwise not receive in a situation of humanitarian emergency.

Finally, peacebuilding CSOs in particular have shifted their focus to the implementation of P/CVE as a consequence of the huge donor funding supply for these programs, oftentimes using the labels of “P/CVE” and “peacebuilding” interchangeably. While both P/CVE and peacebuilding are very broadly defined terms, the label P/CVE raises a lot of suspicion in local communities and creates security risks for local aid workers who implement these programs. Nevertheless, P/CVE is also an instrument for local communities to keep security forces at arm’s length. Many P/CVE programs contain community policing as an integral element which redirects security governance to the local community. It appears that local communities are able to contain direct police engagement in the community, which decreases incidents of police brutality against youth. While many local peacebuilders explain how violent extremism actually is not a main concern in their communities, P/CVE seems to be an important tool to not only gain funding but again paradoxically help secure the community against government crackdowns.

Ultimately, local CSOs in Kenya demonstrate great pragmatism in the implementation of P/CVE by balancing security concerns and local needs within an increasingly competitive donor market. At the beginning, P/CVE might have been a top-down approach to tackle local insecurities that are of concern for international actors and global stability. While international security interests continue to hijack the ‘triple nexus’, local CSOs have used P/CVE to allocate and redirect resources to their own needs, secure their mission in the face of a shrinking civil society space, and protect themselves from direct security interventions.

April 11, 2023. Nora Naji, Visiting Scholar (AY 2022-2023)
Nora Naji is a PhD candidate at the University of Basel, and an associated researcher at swisspeace. Her dissertation ‘Commodifying peace: Intimate warfare and prevention economies in Kenya’ builds on the securitization premise and sets out to situate the agenda of “Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism” (P/CVE) in Kenya within a larger discussion of prevention economies.

This post reflects the opinions of the author and not necessarily the views of NYU, NYU Law or the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice.

Read More
April 11, 2023 Youssef Farhat Post  

Prominent human rights expert admitted as amicus curiae in groundbreaking legal challenge to Ugandan national digital ID system

TECHNOLOGY & HUMAN RIGHTS

Prominent human rights expert admitted as amicus curiae in groundbreaking legal challenge to Ugandan national digital ID system

Today, at the High Court of Uganda in Kampala, the Hon. Justice Boniface Wamala issued a decision to admit the application of Professor Philip Alston of New York University School of Law to participate as amicus curiae, or ‘friend of the court’, in a petition for the enforcement of human rights challenging the use of the country’s national digital ID system as a pre-condition to access to public services.

The admission of the amicus application is a critical development in this groundbreaking litigation, the latest in a series of legal challenges that have raised concerns about national digital ID systems in countries including India, Kenya, and Jamaica. This case is one of the first globally to center concerns around social and economic rights. The applicants, three Ugandan civil society organizations, argue that the national digital ID system suffers from persistent and severe gaps in coverage, and its integration with the country’s social welfare programs has resulted in the exclusion of vulnerable and marginalized individuals from fundamental services such as social protection and healthcare.

“Given the importance of the national digital ID system and its mandatory usage, it is imperative that it is fully inclusive. All Ugandans, regardless of age or economic status, must be able to access their social welfare benefits,” said Professor Alston. “Today’s decision by the High Court is an important and welcome step in that direction.”

In a 32-page brief, Professor Alston seeks to assist the court in analyzing some of the novel legal questions at the heart of the case. He calls attention to the obligations of the Government of Uganda under international human rights law, the serious consequences that digital and non-digital barriers to public services may have on the enjoyment of rights, and the high burden of proof that falls on the government to justify any measure that leads to exclusion. The brief also emphasizes the need to ensure equal treatment and non-discrimination in the enjoyment of these rights, particularly given the high risk that any negative impacts of the digital ID system will continue to fall disproportionately on poor and marginalized groups.

“As many governments turn to digital ID systems to mediate access to essential public services, there is an urgent need for courts to ensure the protection of economic and social rights,” said Professor Alston.

Setting aside the objections of the two government respondents, the Attorney General and the National Identification & Registration Authority, Judge Boniface Wamala stated that the “positive benefits of the intervention as amicus curiae outweighs any possible opposition from the parties in the main cause. It is in public interest, the interest of justice, the protection and progressive development of human rights and socio-economic reform that the leave sought in the application is granted.”

“The court and by extension the multitude of Ugandans whose human rights the main petition is fighting to protect shall benefit from the input and expertise that Prof. Philip shall contribute in its adjudication,” said Counsel Elijah Enyimu, who represented Professor Alston. “The contents of the amicus brief shall be elucidatory on the standards and protections necessary for the realization of ESCR in Uganda.”

The Applicants and Respondents will be back in court to argue their cases on April 5, 2023. In the meantime, those who have missed out on social protection payments or been turned away from health centers due to their inability to access the national digital ID will continue to wait for a judicial decision.

This post was originally published as a press statement on March 24, 2023. 

Read More
March 24, 2023 Dev Account Uncategorized  

Protect Human Rights Defenders and Peasants Facing Land Grabs

CLIMATE & ENVIRONMENT

Protect Human Rights Defenders and Peasants Facing Land Grabs

Haitian Human Rights Defender Milostène Castin Submits Communication to UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders

On November 18, 2022, Global Justice Clinic client and colleague Milostène Castin submitted a formal communication to the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, Mary Lawlor. 

Español
English
Kreyòl

The communication and supporting affidavit presents the threats that Mr. Castin has received against his life as a result of his solidarity and activism with peasants—subsistence farmers—including those who have been victim to forced, and often violent, takings of their land. It requests that the Special Rapporteur send an urgent appeal to the Haitian Government regarding Mr. Castin’s case. The submission was made on November 18th in recognition of the Battle of Vertières, which marked the victory of the enslaved population of Haiti overthrowing Napoleon’s army.

Mr. Castin is the Coordinator for AREDE, Action pour la Reforestation et la Defense de l’Environnement (Action for Reforestation and Defense of the Environment) and has collaborated with the Global Justice Clinic for the past ten years. Mr. Castin has tirelessly defended the rights of peasants in rural Haiti, documenting and challenging land seizures and forced displacement. He has also spoken forcefully about the impacts of extractivism and the climate crisis on peasant communities, for example presenting on environmental racism and climate (in)justice in Haiti at NYU in October 2022, at an event to mark the launch of former Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism E. Tendayi Achiume’s final thematic report.

Mr. Castin has been attacked and intimidated due to his work for many years. The Global Justice Clinic works with Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer to represent Mr. Castin in relation to the threats against him.

Mr. Castin held a press conference in Haiti to coincide with his submission to the Special Rapporteur and to call attention to the ongoing threats to peasant rights in Haiti, particularly land grabs and extractivist projects. He continues to call on Haitian authorities to respect and protect the rights guaranteed by the Haitian Constitution of 1987, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, the International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

This post was originally posted as a press release on November 21, 2022.

Read More
November 21, 2022 Dev Account Uncategorized  

Global Justice Clinic Stands in Solidarity with Indigenous Peoples’ Demands at COP27

CLIMATE & ENVIRONMENT

Global Justice Clinic Stands in Solidarity with Indigenous Peoples’ Demands at COP27

The Global Justice Clinic stands in solidarity with our partners, the South Rupununi District Council, and the broader International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change, also known as the Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus (IPC) as they attend COP27 to advocate for the respect of Indigenous rights in the fight against climate change.

In its opening statement at COP27, the IPC drew attention to the dire impact that the climate crisis has on Indigenous Peoples. The statement, delivered by youth representative Nourene Ahmat Yaya, states that “[c]limate change is a matter of life and death . . . [G]lobal temperatures are increasing, threatening genocide for Indigenous Peoples in Africa, the Arctic, Coastal, Small Islands, and all other ecosystems.” The statement asserts the inherent, collective, and internationally recognized rights of Indigenous Peoples to life, self-determination, territories, and free, prior, and informed consent.

The IPC highlights the need for full and direct participation of Indigenous Peoples in UNFCCC processes and in State actions to combat climate change.   The statement calls on States to include clear indicators for drastic reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in their Nationally Determined Contributions to maintain the Paris Agreement’s 1.5-degree global average temperature increase commitment, noting that the Paris Agreement commits states to respect and promote their obligations to Indigenous Peoples when taking steps toward climate action.

The Global Justice Clinic has a long-standing partnership with the South Rupununi District Council (SRDC), the representative body of the indigenous Wapichan people of Guyana. The Wapichan people are the traditional inhabitants of the Rupununi region of southwestern Guyana. They model sustainable relationships with the earth and practice stewardship of their land as a central tenet of their collective identity. The SRDC has repeatedly asserted the importance of land rights and self-determination in furthering the Wapichan people’s ability to continue their traditional way of life, and to ensure the transmission of customary values between generations.

As such, the Global Justice Clinic supports Immaculata Casimero, Alma O’Connell, and Timothy Williams, SRDC representatives attending COP27, in demanding that the Guyanese government fulfill its obligations to grant legal recognition of the Wapichan territory and recognize the Wapichan people’s contribution to combating the global climate crisis. The SRDC’s effective management and continued protection of Wapichan territory is hindered by national policy that does not recognize their rights to their full territory.

The Global Justice Clinic also joins the IPC and Indigenous rights advocates in underscoring the risks that voluntary carbon markets and the sale of  ‘ecosystem services’ pose to Indigenous Peoples’ rights. These market-based climate solutions risk undermining Indigenous Peoples’ land rights and allowing parties in the Global North to continue exploiting the world’s natural resources without meaningfully contributing to real emissions reductions. The Global Justice Clinic echoes the SRDC’s concerns over the lack of meaningful free, prior, and informed consent in engaging villages over Guyana’s Low-Carbon Development Strategy, which aims to use voluntary carbon markets to become a leader in climate change.

We call on governments at COP27 to listen to Indigenous Peoples. We continue to echo the IPC’s demands for swift action to truly reduce emissions and honor the rights and knowledge of the Indigenous caretakers of our planet.

This post was originally published as a press release on November 18, 2022.

Read More
November 18, 2022 Dev Account Uncategorized  

Racism Causes Climate Vulnerability in Haiti: Collaborative Submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism

CLIMATE & ENVIRONMENT

Racism Causes Climate Vulnerability in Haiti

Collaborative Submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism

On June 20, 2022 the Global Justice Clinic and seven Haitian organizations made a submission  to the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, demonstrating how racism shapes Haitians’ experience of the global climate crisis.  The submission by the Clinic and partners in Haiti — Action pour la Reforestation et la Defense de l’Environnement (Action for Reforestation and Defense of the Environment, AREDE), Commission Épiscopale Nationale Justice et Paix (National Episcopal Commission, Justice and Peace, CE-JILAP), Equal Health, Social Medicine Alumni (SMAH), Kolektif Jistis Min (Justice Mining Collective, KJM), Konbit Ekolojis Sid (Working Together for Ecology, South, KES), Mouvman Fanm Mouvman Peyizan Papay (Women’s Movement of the Peasants’ Movement of Papay, MPP), Sant Altènatif Kominote ak Lapè (Alternative Center for Community and Peace, SAKALA) and Sosyete Kiltirèl Jen Ayisyen (Haitian Youth Cultural Society, SOKIJA) — will inform the Special Rapporteur’s upcoming report to the UN General Assembly on racial and climate justice.

English
Kreyòl

Haiti is consistently named as one of the five countries most vulnerable to climate change in the world. Drawing on the perspectives and experiences of Haitian community organizers, advocates, and social movement leaders, the submission highlights the ways in which the climate crisis is already devastating Haitian communities and reinforcing marginalization — with rural farmers, women, and poor urban communities bearing the worst impacts — and briefly outlines the racist roots of the country’s climate vulnerability. The submission also outlines how racism and xenophobia assure that Haitian migrants experience disproportionate climate vulnerability and harms wherever they live, even beyond Haiti’s borders. An annex presents written statements prepared by contributing Haitian organizations.

As the Special Rapporteur presents her report this fall ahead of COP 27, the submission argues that Haiti exemplifies that just responses to the global climate crisis must center racial justice.

This post was originally published as a press release on July 6, 2022.

Read More
July 6, 2022 Dev Account Uncategorized  

Clinics call on the U.S. government to take urgent steps to address insecurity and gang violence in Haiti

HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Clinics call on the U.S. government to take urgent steps to address insecurity and gang violence in Haiti

The NYU Global Justice Clinic, the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, and the Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School call on the U.S. government to take urgent steps to address insecurity and gang violence in Haiti.  The clinics are deeply concerned that the U.S. government continues to support de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry, despite strong evidence of his government’s involvement in broadening violence.  The Clinics are alarmed about recent and serious threats against human rights defenders, particularly concerning staff of the Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH). The status quo puts human rights defenders—and all Haitian people—at risk.  The clinics are in close contact with Haitian civil society, and stress that recent U.S. legislation, the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Act and the Global Fragility Act, recognizes the right of Haitian people to self-determination. Together, the clinics urge the U.S. government to:

  1. Support Haitian-led investigation of and accountability for human rights abuses
  2. Ensure transparency in the U.S. investigation of the murder of former President Jovenel Moïse
  3. Take concrete, effective steps to enforce U.S. laws on arms trafficking
  4. Shift support from Dr. Henry towards an inclusive and Haitian-led political process.
Download Statement

June 27, 2022. Statements of the Global Justice Clinic do not purport to represent the views of NYU or the Center, if any.

Read More
June 27, 2022 Dev Account Uncategorized  

The World Bank and co. may be paving a ‘Digital Road to Hell’ with support for dangerous digital ID

TECHNOLOGY & HUMAN RIGHTS

The World Bank and co. may be paving a ‘Digital Road to Hell’ with support for dangerous digital ID

Global actors, led by the World Bank, are energetically promoting biometric and other digital ID systems that are increasingly linked to large-scale human rights violations, especially in the Global South. A report by researchers at New York University warns that these systems, promoted in the name of development and inclusion, might be achieving neither. Rather than the equitable digital future envisioned by the World Bank and its Identification for Development (ID4D) Initiative, the report argues that “despite undoubted good intentions on the part of some, [these systems] may well be paving a digital road to hell.”

Report cover: Paving a digital road to hell?
Download the report

The report, at over 100 pages, is intended to be a “carefully researched primer as well as a call to action to all of those with an interest in safeguarding human rights to set their gaze more firmly on the multidimensional dangers associated with digital ID systems.” Governments around the world have been investing heavily in digital identification systems, often with biometric components (digital ID). The rapid proliferation of such systems is driven by a new development consensus, packaged and promoted by key global actors like the World Bank, but also by governments, foundations, vendors and consulting firms. This new ‘manufactured consensus’ holds that digital ID can contribute to inclusive and sustainable development—and is even a prerequisite for the realization of human rights.

Drawing inspiration from the Aadhaar system in India, the dangerous digital ID model that is being promoted prioritizes what the primer refers to as an ‘economic identity’.  The goal of such systems is primarily to establish ‘uniqueness’ of individuals, commonly with the help of biometric technologies. The ultimate objective of such digital ID systems is to facilitate economic transactions and private sector service delivery while also bringing new, poorer, individuals into formal economies and ‘unlocking’ their behavioral data. As the Executive Chairman of the influential ID4Africa, a platform where African governments and major companies in the digital ID market meet, put it at the start of its 2022 Annual Meeting earlier this week, digital ID is no longer about identity alone but “enables and interacts with authentication platforms, payments systems, digital signatures, data sharing, KYC systems, consent management and sectoral delivery platforms.”

Unlike ‘traditional systems’ of civil registration, such as birth registration, this new model of economic identity commonly sidesteps difficult questions about the legal status of those it registers and the rights associated with that status. The promises of inclusion and flourishing digital economies might appear attractive on paper, but digital ID systems have consistently failed to deliver on these promises in real world situations, especially for the most marginalized. In fact, evidence is emerging from many countries, most notably the mega digital ID project Aadhaar in India, of the severe and large-scale human rights violations linked to this model. These systems may in fact exacerbate pre-existing forms of exclusion and discrimination in public and private services. The use of new technologies may furthermore lead to novel forms of harm, including biometric exclusion, discrimination, and the many harms associated with “surveillance capitalism.”

Meanwhile, the benefits of digital ID remain ill-defined and poorly documented. From what evidence does exist, it seems that those who stand to benefit most may not be those “left behind”,but instead a small group of companies and governments. After all, where digital ID systems have tended to excel is in generating lucrative contracts for biometrics companies and enhancing the surveillance and migration-control capabilities of governments.

With such powerful backing, digital ID has taken on the guise of an unstoppable juggernaut and inevitable hallmark of modernity and development in the 21st century, and the dissenting voices of civil society have been written off as Luddites and barriers to progress. Nevertheless, the report calls on human rights organizations, other civil society organizations, and advocates who may have been on the sidelines of these debates to get more involved.  The actual and potential human rights violations arising from this model of digital ID can be severe and potentially irreversible. The human rights community can play an important role in ensuring that such transformational changes are not rushed and are based on serious evidence and analysis. It can also ensure that there is sufficient public debate, with full transparency and involving all relevant stakeholders, not in the least the most marginalized and most affected individuals. Where necessary to safeguard human rights, such dangerous digital ID systems should be stopped altogether.

This post was originally published as a press release on June 17, 2022.

Read More
June 17, 2022 Dev Account Uncategorized  

Paving a Digital Road to Hell? A Primer on the Role of the World Bank and Global Networks in Promoting Digital ID

TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Paving a Digital Road to Hell? 

A Primer on the Role of the World Bank and Global Networks in Promoting Digital ID

Around the world, governments are enthusiastically adopting digital identification systems. In this 2022 report, we show how global actors, led by the World Bank, are energetically promoting such systems. They proclaim that digital ID will provide an indispensable foundation for an equitable, inclusive future. But a specific model of digital ID is being promoted—and a growing body of evidence shows that this model of digital ID is linked to large-scale human rights violations. In this report, we argue that, despite undoubted good intentions, this model of digital ID is failing to live up to its promises and may in fact be causing severe harm. As international development actors continue to promote and support digital ID rollouts, there is an urgent need to consider the full implications of these systems and to ensure that digital ID realizes rather than violates human rights.

Download report

In this report, we provide a carefully researched primer, as well as a call to action with practical recommendations. We first compile evidence from around the world, providing a rigorous overview of the impacts that digital ID systems have had on human rights across different contexts. We show that the implementation of the dominant model of digital ID is increasingly causing severe and large-scale human rights violations, especially since such systems may exacerbate pre-existing forms of exclusion from public and private services. The use of new technologies may also lead to new forms of harm, including biometric exclusion, discrimination along new cleavages, and the many harms associated with surveillance capitalism. Meanwhile, the promised benefits of such systems have not been convincingly proven. This primer draws on the work of experts and activists working across multiple fields to identify critical concerns and evidentiary gaps within this new development consensus on digital ID.

The report points specifically to the World Bank and its Identification for Development (ID4D) Initiative as playing a central role in the rapid proliferation of a particular model of digital ID, one that is heavily inspired by the Aadhaar system in India. Under this approach to digital ID, the aim is to provide individuals with a ‘transactional’ identity, rather than to engage with questions surrounding legal status and rights. We argue that a driving force behind the widespread and rapid adoption of such systems is a powerful new development consensus, which holds that digital ID can contribute to inclusive and sustainable development—and is even a prerequisite for the realization of human rights. This consensus is packaged and promoted by key global actors like the World Bank, as well as by governments, foundations, vendors and consulting firms. It is contributing to the proliferation of digital ID around the world, all while insufficient attention is paid to risks and necessary safeguards.

The report concludes by arguing for a shift in policy discussions around digital ID, including the need to open new critical conversations around the “Identification for Development Agenda,” and encourage greater discourse around the role of human rights in a digital age. We issue a call to action for civil society actors and human rights stakeholders, with practical suggestions for those in the human rights ecosystem to consider. The report sets out key questions that civil society can ask of governments and international development institutions, and specific asks that can be made—including demanding that processes be slowed down so that sufficient care is taken, and increasing transparency surrounding discussions about digital ID systems, among others—to ensure that human rights are safeguarded in the implementation of digital ID systems.

Read More
June 1, 2022 Youssef Farhat Uncategorized  

Can human rights provide a hopeful vision of a more equal future?

INEQUALITIES

Can human rights provide a hopeful vision of a more equal future?

Rampant inequality around the world has forced the international human rights community to confront a basic yet controversial question – what to do about it?

Two trees floating on water contrasting two different seasons alluding to prosperity and poverty.
Lightspring (shutterstock)

International human rights have struggled to provide satisfactory answers to poverty and inequality since their inception. From debates around the use of political means to address social issues in the aftermath of World War II, to more recent discussions on the false dichotomy between social justice and human rights, much has happened within the human rights field in terms of its engagement with socio-economic issues. Yet answers to the question of what a rights-based vision to end poverty and inequality could look like continue to prove elusive.

For much of the 20th century, progressive leaders and thinkers focused their message on the hopeful possibility of a better future. Workers rallied for better working conditions and women demonstrated for more freedoms and rights. Human rights provided a positive narrative on which to build these demands. Today, however, hopeful narratives about a brighter future no longer have the galvanizing effect they once had. Climate change is irreversible and political leadership is clearly not up to the task. Promised technological advancements have brought exclusion and precariousness in the gig economy. Undue privileging of pharma interests in political decisions has meant that COVID-19 vaccine distribution remains deeply unequal. The list keeps going, and yet the human rights community struggles to provide a positive, proactive vision of the future.

The pandemic has prompted many to call for a redesign of the economic system, and this has provided an opening for actors in the human rights field. The World Economic Forum, for example, argued for a “Great Reset,” an opportunity to “reimagine” the economy towards “stakeholder capitalism.” In this apolitical, conflict-less vision of the world, economic problems exist out there, in a vacuum, waiting for someone to solve them. Conflict can be resolved through a “social contract” and “agreement on shared values” between governments, businesses, and individuals. But can there be a social contract and an agreement on shared values while Jeff Bezos had “the best day ever” as he flew into space for $28 million, and the equivalent of 125 million people have lost their jobs since the start of the pandemic? Can there be “shared values” when the poorest half owns 2% of total wealth and the richest 10% own 76%?

Although there is now growing consensus that inequality is problematic in more ways than one, the question is whether human rights provide a positive, hopeful vision to end it. But, for this to happen, the human rights community must first face a prior, very basic question – what to do about it? Should human rights aim at eradicating inequalities or simply at “reducing” them? Even if we agree on what the goal is, how do we accomplish it? Do we reduce the number of poor or the number of billionaires?

These seemingly basic questions point at broader, generalized misunderstandings of the relationship between poverty and inequality that the human rights field has not fully solved yet.

Those with an interest in maintaining the status quo continue to spread damaging ideas that further entrench inequality based on the concepts of “meritocracy” and “trickle-down” economics. At their most basic, these fallacies argue that when those at the top are rewarded for their ability and effort, their high earnings will continue to incentivize them and will also benefit those at the bottom, notably in the form of jobs, higher wages, and better products. Following this, government policies should support the wealthy, including through tax breaks at the top, because they will somehow “trickle down” to the poor.

As it turns out, these beliefs are particularly present in countries where income inequality is highest. They are typically held by those who already see high inequality levels as legitimate, which is in turn typically stronger in individuals with higher incomes. The perceived gap between the poor and the rich in terms of their “merit” also happens to grow in more unequal societies, leading people to assume that inequality of income correlates strongly with inequality of merit. In other words, higher inequality levels lead those with higher incomes to perceive the poor as less “meritorious” and more deserving of their socioeconomic situation, and therefore to justify inequality on the basis of unequal merit.

Moreover, while higher inequality damages societies in their entirety, it harms some more than others. People in poverty and those on low incomes are particularly impacted by inequality. With higher inequality, their incomes decrease, their educational attainment drops, and their health worsens. In contrast, individuals on high incomes and wealth remain largely undisturbed by inequality. Their personal connections, used to access high-paying jobs, good quality schools, and top healthcare, endure.

And yet addressing inequality as a precondition for poverty eradication remains taboo. Charity towards the poor is perceived as a generally accepted response to poverty, whereas questioning inequality, which necessarily leads to questioning the legitimacy or appropriateness of top incomes and wealth accumulation, is still a political anathema.

The international human rights community can and should question these beliefs and provide a renewed hopeful vision of a more equal future. For that, looking at poverty from a human rights perspective must necessarily entail examining income and wealth concentration at both the bottom and the top – beginning with claiming tax justice, making social protection universal, demanding adequate funding for public services, and redefining what long-term public investments look like. The future of human rights largely depends on our ability, as human rights advocates, to develop an expertise in these topics, dispel damaging myths, and strategically infuse the language of rights and obligations within them.

May 25, 2022. Paula Fernandez-Wulff, Visiting Scholar (AY 2021-2022).
Paula Fernandez-Wulff is the Senior Advisor to the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights and Scholar in Residence, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law. 

This post reflects the opinions of the author and not necessarily the views of NYU, NYU Law or the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice. The views presented here should also not be attributed to the United Nations or any of its agencies.

Read More
May 25, 2022 Youssef Farhat Post  

Sorting in Place of Solutions for Homeless Populations: How Federal Directives Prioritize Data Over Services

TECHNOLOGY & HUMAN RIGHTS

Sorting in Place of Solutions for Homeless Populations: How Federal Directives Prioritize Data Over Services

National data collection and service prioritization were supposed to make homeless services more equitable and efficient. Instead, they have created more risks and bureaucratic burdens for homeless individuals and homeless service organizations.

While serving as an AmeriCorps VISTA member supporting the IT and holistic defense teams at a California public defender, much of my time was spent navigating the data bureaucracy that now weighs down social service providers across the country. In particular, I helped social workers and other staff members use tools like the Vulnerability Index – Service Prioritization Decision Assistance Tool (VI-SPDAT) and a Homeless Management Information System (HMIS). While these tools were ostensibly designed to improve care for homeless and housing insecure people, all too often they did the opposite.

An HMIS is a localized information network and database used to collect client-level data and data on the provision of housing and services to homeless or at-risk persons. In 2011, Congress passed the HEARTH Act, mandating the use of HMIS by communities in order to receive federal funding. HMIS demands coordinated entry, a process by which certain types of data are cataloged and clients are ranked according to their perceived need. One of the most common tools for coordinated entry—and the one used by the social workers I worked with—is VI-SPDAT. VI-SPDAT is effectively a questionnaire which involves a battery of highly invasive questions which seek to determine the level of need of the homeless or housing insecure individual to whom it is administered.

These tools have been touted as game-changers, but while homelessness across the country, and especially in California, continued to decrease modestly in the years immediately following the enactment of the HEARTH act, it began to increase again in 2019 and sharply increased in 2020, even before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not to suggest a causal link; indeed, the evidence suggests that factors such as rising housing costs and a worsening methamphetamine epidemic are at the heart of rising homelessness. But there is little evidence that intrusive tools like VI-SPDAT alleviate these problems.

Indeed, these tools have themselves been creating problems for homeless persons and social workers alike. There have been harsh criticisms from scholars like Virginia Eubanks about the accuracy and usefulness of VI-SPDAT. It has been found to produce unreliable and racially biased results. Rather than decreasing bias as it purports to do, VI-SPDAT has baked bias into its algorithms, providing a veneer of scientific objectivity for government officials to hide behind.

But, even if these tools were to be made more reliable and less biased,  they would nonetheless cause harm and stigmatization. Homeless individuals and social workers alike report finding the assessment dehumanizing and distressing. For homeless individuals, it can also feel deeply risky. Those who don’t score high enough on the assessment are often denied housing and assistance altogether. Those who score too high run the risk of involuntary institutionalization.

Meanwhile, these tools place significant burdens on social workers. To receive federal funding, organizations must provide not only an intense amount of highly intimate information about homeless persons and their life histories, but also a minute accounting of every interaction between the social worker and the client. One social worker would frequently work with clients from 9-5, go home to make dinner for her children, and then work into the wee hours of the night attempting to log all of her data requirements.

I once sat through a 45-minute video call with a veteran social worker who broke down into tears worried that the grant funding her position might be taken away if her record keeping was less than perfect, but the design of the HMIS made it virtually impossible to be completely honest. The system anticipated that four-hour client interactions could easily be broken down into distinct chunks—discussed x problem from 4:15 to 4:30, y problem from 4:30 to 4:45, and so on. Of course, anyone who has ever had a conversation with another human being, let alone a human being with mental disabilities or substance use problems, knows that interactions are rarely so tidy and linear.

While this data is claimed to be kept very secure, in reality, hundreds of people in dozens of organizations typically have access to any given HMIS. There are guidelines in place to protect the data, but there is minimal monitoring to ensure that these guidelines are being followed, and many users found them very difficult to follow while working from home during the pandemic. I heard multiple stories of police or prosecutors improperly accessing information from HMIS. Clients can request to have their information removed from the system, but the process for doing so is rarely made clear to them, nor is this process clear even for the social workers processing the data.

After years of criticism, OrgCode—the group which develops VI-SPDAT—announced in 2021 that it would no longer be pushing VI-SPDAT updates, and as of 2022 it is no longer providing support for the current iteration of VI-SPDAT. While this is a commendable move from OrgCode, stakeholders in homeless services must acknowledge the larger failures of HMIS and coordinate entry more generally. Many of the other tools used to perform coordinated entry have similar problems to VI-SPDAT, in part because coordinated entry in effect requires this intrusive data collection about highly personal issues to determine needs and rank clients accordingly. The problems are baked into the data requirements of coordinated entry itself.

The answer to this problem cannot be to completely do away with any classification tools for housing insecure individuals, because understanding the scope and demographics of homelessness is important in tackling it. But clearly a drastic overhaul of these systems is needed to make sure that they are efficient, noninvasive, and accurate. Above all, it is crucial to remember that tools for sorting homeless individuals are only useful to the extent that they ultimately provide better access to the services that actually alleviate homelessness, like affordable housing, mental health treatment, and addiction support. Demanding that beleaguered social service providers prioritize data collection over services, all while using intrusive, racially biased, and dehumanizing tools, will only worsen an intensifying crisis.

May 17, 2022. Batya Kemper, J.D. program, NYU School of Law.

Read More
May 17, 2022 Dev Account Uncategorized