Fair Pay for Public Defenders: If Mongolia Can Do It, Any Country Can

HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Fair Pay for Public Defenders: If Mongolia can do it, any country can

On the first day of 2023, Mongolia’s public defenders received a 300% pay raise. A new law took effect on January 1st that ties the compensation of publicly funded defense attorneys to their courtroom counterparts, prosecutors. Although Mongolia ranks among the world’s poorest countries, it has achieved something that many of the world’s wealthiest states have failed to: pay equity between public defenders and public prosecutors.

Oyunchimeg Ayush (wearing blue in the photo), then the head of the Mongolian state agency responsible for public defense.

A central tenet of adversarial legal systems is that justice is best served when opposing sides are fairly matched. As the European Court of Human Rights put it, “[i]t is a fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial that criminal proceedings…should be adversarial and that there should be equality of arms between the prosecution and defence.” Similarly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights says that public defenders should be empowered to act “on equal terms with the prosecution.”

If the goal is a fair fight in the courtroom, it seems obvious that paying public defenders just a third of what prosecutors make would detract from that goal. Yet around the world, such pay disparities are commonplace, a phenomenon I saw firsthand as Global Policy Director for the International Legal Foundation, an NGO that builds public defender systems across the globe.

One reason for this disparity is that most domestic constitutions are silent on this issue. And even in the realm of international law, where the “equality of arms” principle is a well-established component of the bedrock international instrument on fair trial rights, courts have not interpreted this to require “material equality” between prosecution and defense. For example, this ICTR case found no fault with the fact that the prosecution’s team comprised 35 investigators deployed for several years, while the defense team had just two investigators paid to work for a few months. 

Instead, equality of arms is mainly conceived of in procedural terms, such as this HRC case where the court’s failure to allow defense counsel to cross-examine the victim was found to violate the principle. As applied to resources, equality of arms requires only that the resources available to the accused are “adequate” to present a full defense (as the Caribbean Court of Justice points out in §33).

Absent promising legal grounds, the battle for pay parity must be fought in the political arena. But there are major challenges here, too, mainly that elected officials are not usually keen on funding services for people accused of heinous crimes. Public defenders around the world have had to embrace vigorous strategies to compel political action, such as labor strikes and joining forces with prosecutors.

So how did Mongolia do it? Dedicated advocacy by a committed public official.

Oyunchimeg Ayush (wearing blue in the photo to the right), then the head of the state agency responsible for public defense, had grown tired of trying to recruit and retain qualified attorneys on salaries 70-80% lower than prosecutors and judges. She saw the unequal pay not only as unfair but as inefficient: high turnover increased recruitment and training costs and yielded a less-experienced workforce.

So, she started making her case for equal pay. She met with legislators, justice system stakeholders, and cabinet ministers, where she found a key ally in Khishgeegiin Nyambaatar, the Minister of Justice and Home Affairs. She also reached out to the ILF to ask for research on pay parity and examples of other jurisdictions who had achieved it. We pointed her to Argentina, which passed a parity law in 2015, and to the American state of Connecticut, which has had a parity law for 30 years and has been recognized for excellence. This partnership between local and international actors echoes the ongoing debate among human rights scholars like Gráinne de Búrca, Margaret Keck, Kathryn Sikkink and others about how human rights reform is actually achieved. Eventually, Mongolia’s Parliament, known as the Great Khural, amended the legal aid law to require that public defender wage rates equal those received by prosecutors. 

Mongolia’s achievement is all the more impressive in light of its economic constraints. The Mongolian government’s annual budget is roughly $6 billion. Juxtapose this with the American states of Florida and Oregon, whose failure to pass pay parity legislation in recent years was largely justified on budgetary grounds. Oregon’s annual budget? $67 billion. Florida’s? $101.5 billion

Though Mongolia’s achievement is monumental, even these reforms do not amount to true equality of arms between public defenders and prosecutors. In recent years, many commentators have argued that individual pay parity—between defense and prosecution lawyers—is insufficient to ensure an equal playing field. Instead, they argue that what is needed is institutional parity. For example, the leading international instrument on good practices for public defender systems calls for “fair and proportional distribution of funds between prosecution and legal aid agencies,” and the American Bar Association says that parity should extend beyond salaries to include workloads, technology, facilities, investigators, support staff, legal research tools, and access to forensic services and experts.

The inclusion of defense investigators is particularly important. Prosecutors aren’t the only government agents that help prosecute a criminal case. Much of the work of collecting evidence and facilitating witness testimony is done by the police. But police investigations are often subtly (or not subtly) shaped by the prosecution’s theory of the case, and police agencies have historically been less than eager to turn over exculpatory evidence. For this reason, public defender performance standards generally mandate that defense attorneys conduct their own independent investigations. A truer apples-to-apples comparison for public defense agency budgets should not only include the prosecution agency, but also some portion of the police budget, too. 

Mongolia’s revised law does not yet achieve parity on this institutional level, but individual parity is still a huge and significant step, one that is particularly remarkable in light of Mongolia’s economic constraints. Their achievement stands as an admonition to wealthier jurisdictions who claim that pay parity is too expensive. 

Congratulations to the members of the Great Khural, for passing this law; Minister Nyambaatar, for championing it; Oyunchimeg Ayush, for catalyzing this effort; and, above all, to the Mongolian public defenders whose pay finally reflects their vital role in achieving justice. 

May 19, 2023. Ben Polk, Bernstein Institute for Human Rights of NYU Law School. 

This post reflects the opinions of the author and not necessarily the views of NYU, NYU Law or the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice.

Comments on Draft of the NIST Digital Identity Guidelines, Special Publication 800-63-4

TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Comments on Draft of the NIST Digital Identity Guidelines, Special Publication 800-63-4

In April 2023, the Digital Welfare State & Human Rights Project at the Center along with the Institute for Law, Innovation & Technology (iLIT) at Temple University, Beasley School of Law submitted comments to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in response to a consultation regarding their draft Digital Identity Guidelines.

In formulating these comments, we drew on examples from many other countries and contexts beyond the United States. After all, these Guidelines have the potential to shape the development not only of the digital ID systems that will be used by U.S. federal agencies, but also of digital ID systems around the world, given that NIST publications serve as a reference point and source of legitimization globally. Drawing on a global evidence base of the impacts of digital ID systems, our contribution to the consultation seeks to ensure that the Guidelines accurately identify and guard against some of the most acute risks of harm, particularly for those who are already experiencing marginalization and discrimination. We hope that our comments will provide actionable guidance to ensure that digital identity systems fulfill the central goal of advancing equity.

Communities in Haiti Renew their Protests Against Newmont Mining Concessions

CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT

Communities in Haiti Renew their Protests Against Newmont Mining Concessions

Today [April 26, 2023], Newmont—the largest gold mining company in the world—is holding its Annual General Meeting (AGM). This year, Newmont will be focused on pitching shareholders on its proposed acquisition of Australia’s Newcrest Mining Limited. On the other side of the world, Haitian organizations continue to protest its activities in the country’s Massif du Nord mountain range.

Newmont conducted exploration in Haiti between 2009 and 2013 under permits that covered swathes of the country’s North but has been unable to exploit its now-expired concessions due to political and legal obstacles. A revised Mining Law, drafted with World Bank assistance and presented to Parliament in 2017, has yet to pass due to Haiti’s ongoing political crisis. If and when it does pass, it is believed that industrial gold mining would commence. However, the gravity of the humanitarian situation in the country presents another significant hurdle for Newmont: recent reports suggest that gang violence, disease, and food insecurity continue to escalate. 

Since 2013, the Global Justice Clinic has worked in solidarity with social justice and community organizations in Haiti who oppose metal mining. In the small, densely populated country, where many depend on subsistence agriculture, the environmental and human rights impacts of Newmont’s proposed open-pit mines would be disastrous.

This April, communities in the North of Haiti marked Newmont’s AGM by renewing their opposition to the company’s presence on their land. Sixteen local organizations signed a declaration which reiterates their resistance to metal mining and denounces, in the strongest terms, the environmental harm and loss of livelihoods that Newmont’s proposed mine would entail. Their declaration calls on all the communities in the world suffering under the threat of mining operations to “bring our strength and energy together to defend our lives.”

To bring these concerns to the attention of investors, the Global Justice Clinic has published a brief setting out a business case against Newmont’s proposed mining operations in Haiti. In the view of the Clinic and its partners, the material, environmental, and human rights risks of metal mining in Haiti outweigh the value of any investment. Newmont should dissolve its Haitian subsidiaries and responsibly disengage from the country, including by cleaning up its encampments.

April 26, 2023.

What are post-PACT Act possibilities for recognition and compensation of Iraqi victims of war toxins?

PREVENTION AND CONFLICT

What are post-PACT Act possibilities for recognition and compensation for Iraqi victims of war toxins?

The US PACT Act, enacted in 2022, offers unprecedented healthcare and compensation for 3.5 million US military veterans suffering from illnesses linked to toxic exposure. What are the possibilities for comparable recognition and support for Iraqi civilians who continue to live amidst the same war toxins, and what role can international law play in achieving justice?

With the discomfort of the first morning approaching and the heat slowly raising, the sand had picked up with the wind and started to attack us. Though if you notice, nobody stopped, people kept going on. An army personal is seen in this image, helping to guide and protect from any threats, this would be along the whole journey and into the city of Karbala itself.
Jaffer Hasan (iStock)

April 2023 marks eight months since the PACT Act (Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics Act) went into effect in the United States in August 2022. The PACT Act is “the most significant law ever helping victims exposed to toxic burn pits,” as described in US President Joe Biden’s February 2023 State of the Union address. Indeed, the PACT Act unprecedentedly offers healthcare and disability compensation for approximately 3.5 million veterans harmed by burn pits and other toxic exposures. It not only promises long awaited compensation for veterans who served in the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan beginning in 2003 and 2001 respectively, but also covers veterans harmed by herbicides during the Vietnam War, 1990–91 Gulf War veterans, and those who served in numerous other locations including Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and many more. Veterans will be presumed eligible according to dates and locations of service, and no longer have to prove the direct link between their exposure and their illness, often an impossible task.

No comparable mechanism is in place, however, to recognize and assist civilians facing ongoing toxic assaults in contaminated environments, including in Iraq. Iraqi civilians suffer from disturbingly high rates of congenital anomalies (birth defects) and cancers, leading to conditions of inescapable health devastation, something I deem “toxic saturation” in my research.

Does the PACT Act offer any hope for comparable support for non-US civilians? Or does the Act represent the latest iteration of a deeply flawed approach when it comes to the US’s response to victims of war toxins? In this post, I address these questions as they impact Iraqi civilians, and examine international law’s role for addressing irreparable harm experienced by civilians forcibly exposed to war toxins.

The Scale of “Toxic Saturation”

A 2019 Environmental Pollution study documented that children living in proximity to a US military base near Nasiriyah, Iraq, had an increased likelihood of congenital anomalies including neural tube defects (such as spina bifida, anencephaly, and hydrocephalus), congenital heart diseases, and musculoskeletal malformations (including missing right hand and paralyzed clubfoot). Doctors in Fallujah have long reported a staggering post-2003 surge in birth defects.

It is important to understand the scale of war toxins that the US military and its allies introduced to Iraq. More than 780,000 rounds of depleted uranium (DU) were used in 1991, and more than 300,000 rounds in 2003, as reported by Dutch peace organization PAX. As explained by the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), “DU is a potential health hazard if it enters the body, such as through embedded fragments, contaminated wounds, and inhalation or ingestion.”

The US military admits to using white phosphorus as an incendiary weapon in Fallujah in 2004. Incendiary weapons, as explained by Human Rights Watch (HRW), “produce heat and fire through the chemical reaction of a flammable substance, cause excruciating burns and destroy homes and other civilian structures.” The US later used white phosphorus again in Iraq and Syria in operations targeting the Islamic State. As described by HRW’s Stephen Goose, “No matter how white phosphorus is used, it poses a high risk of horrific and long lasting harm in crowded cities like Raqqa and Mosul and any other areas with concentrations of civilians.”

Another key source of toxic exposure for veterans is burn pits. As I wrote for Al Jazeera in August 2022, burn pits are open air pits of military waste, sometimes as large as football fields, used to burn and destroy weapons, chemicals, plastics, and medical and human waste, typically using jet fuel. Joe Biden has been vocal about his son Beau’s fatal brain cancer, believed to be caused by exposure to burn pits while serving with the US military in Iraq and working in Kosovo.

International Law and Compensation for Health Destruction

Compensation is essential for providing medical care and lifetime assistance to Iraqis struggling to survive due to toxic saturation. Veterans have faced health devastation following relatively short-term exposure, while civilians have been left behind to languish amidst war toxins. As noted in my research on water access, however, international law faces significant enforceability challenges regarding reparations for victims of environmental destruction in the context of armed conflict.

The US in particular has a discouraging track record. The US government long denied illnesses linked to deadly, dioxin-containing herbicides, including Agent Orange, experienced by Vietnam War veterans. Funding dedicated to Vietnamese civilians and environmental clean-up has been a mere fraction of what is needed, especially as children continue to be born with severe congenital anomalies nearly fifty years after the Vietnam War ended in 1975.

In principle, international law clearly provides the basis for reparations for Iraqi civilians. Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions addresses the illegality of environmental damage and health destruction, and reparations for harm caused. Article 55 requires that care is taken in warfare “to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage.” This protection prohibits methods “which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.” Article 91 states that parties that violate international humanitarian law shall “be liable to pay compensation.” The Environmental Modification Convention forbids military “environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury.”

Furthermore, monetary compensation is not the only aspect of reparations currently being denied for Iraqis. As Christine Evans writes, “There is a common misconception that reparations are synonymous with monetary compensation” when reparations actually encompass financial and non-financial meanings: “restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction (disclosure of the truth), and guarantees of non repetition.”

Following the significant agreement on “loss and damage” funding at COP27 in November 2022, compensation for developing countries impacted by climate disasters, long on the agenda of climate justice advocates, was brought to the center of the world stage, though much work remains to be done to ensure compensation is provided to those in need of it.

Comprehensive environmental justice requires that all victims of environmental injustice, including both victims of the climate crisis and of toxic environmental assaults during and following war, are recognized and compensated. The PACT Act is an overdue victory for veterans and sets a precedent for compensation following wartime toxic exposure. The US government cannot stop here, only recognizing veterans affected by war toxins. The US must be pressured to acknowledge the existence and suffering of Iraqi civilians and all people harmed by war toxins, and to provide the care and compensation that is owed to them.

April 21, 2023. Carly A. Krakow, Visiting Scholar (AY 2022-2023)
Carly A. Krakow is a writer, journalist, faculty member at the NYU Gallatin School, and completing her PhD in International Law at the London School of Economics as a Judge Rosalyn Higgins Scholar and Modern Law Review Scholar. 

This post reflects the opinions of the author and not necessarily the views of NYU, NYU Law or the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice.

Prevention economies in Kenya: Peace, Power & Pragmatism?

PREVENTION AND CONFLICT

Prevention economies in Kenya: Peace, Power and Pragmatism?

While international security interests continue to hijack the ‘triple nexus’, local CSOs have used Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) to allocate and redirect resources to their own needs, secure their mission in the face of a shrinking civil society space, and protect themselves from direct security interventions.

Golden Brown (iStock)

The Emergence of the ‘Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism’ Agenda

“Conflict prevention” is an umbrella term for a variety of interventions in the peacebuilding field that aim at addressing factors that could lead to violent conflict. SDG 16 in the UN 2030 agenda makes an important contribution to the realm of conflict prevention with the target goal to “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.” After years of hard counter-terrorism strategies, preventive measures to address the root causes of radicalization have also gained traction in the Global War on Terror. The United States, supported by the United Nations, have played a central role in this paradigm shift and the introduction of the concept ‘Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism’ (P/CVE), which replaced the dominant notion of ‘Counter-Terrorism’ (CT) in policy spaces in 2015. P/CVE has since become the globally accepted security strategy to address violent extremism, by underscoring a whole-of-society approach, as well as the localization of the fight against terrorism. While P/CVE is very much a security strategy, the agenda is now also closely linked to SDG 16 through the emphasis on strengthening civil society and government institutions, building social cohesion and resilience, addressing local grievances and respecting human rights. At the core of this union between P/CVE as a security strategy and peacebuilding lies the concept of ‘human security’, which is defined by the UNDP as ‘freedom of want’ and ‘freedom of fear’. ‘Human security’ focuses on the individual grievances that may incite violence. Consequently, many security approaches are no longer solely based on military power, but include humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding initiatives. Within this vein, CSOs have thus become integral to the realization of the agenda. As a result, critics argue that P/CVE has securitized and co-opted the civil society space, thereby forging a dangerous liaison between security actors and CSOs.

Securitization of the Civil Society Space in Kenya

In the first years, after its global adoption in 2015, the P/CVE agenda was implemented through National Action Plans (NAPs) with great enthusiasm from the international community. Particularly, the United States supported its allies around the world in the adoption of the agenda through technical assistance and donor funding. Kenya is one of the US’s main strategic allies in the Global War on Terror in Africa and has been at the forefront of adopting the P/CVE agenda in the last 7 years. While donors decreased their funding through COVID-19 and the presidential election in 2022, P/CVE is still one of the main donor priorities in Kenya to this day. Since the introduction of P/CVE in 2016 through a National Action Plan (NAP), many CSOs have geared towards the implementation of P/CVE programs to access funding for their programs. The international donor industry, which is heavily influenced by security interests in the Horn of Africa, has thus very much impacted the civil society space in Kenya. As the Kenyan government considers violent extremism a national security issue, every organization that implements P/CVE must report to the National Center for Counterterrorism (NCTC) under the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) since a 2019 amendment. CSOs therefore have to report to the authorities about P/CVE programs, which can include sensitive information about the program participants. As a consequence, local communities have accused CSOs of espionage and surveillance, thereby criticizing the alignment of aid programs with security interventions. While the securitization of the civil society space in Kenya through the integration of security strategies into aid programs in the name of prevention has certainly led to many trust issues between CSOs and local communities, the question of agency and resistance of CSOs is central in understanding P/CVE in Kenya. CSOs are subject to complex negotiations between international security agendas, funding scarcity, and local agency. I will briefly discuss the entanglement of the security-oriented P/CVE agenda in three key areas in the aid architecture: human rights (1), humanitarian and development aid (2), and peacebuilding (3).

The Entanglement of P/CVE with the Aid Architecture

In the aftermath of heavy security crackdowns against Muslim communities after the Westgate mall attack in 2013 and counter-terrorism operations along the coast, Kenyan human rights organizations were very vocal about the human rights violations including forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings committed by Kenyan security forces and brought international attention onto the situation. As a response, the government listed two leading human rights organizations as terrorist entities which resulted in the freezing of their bank accounts. After a legal battle the court finally ruled the accusation as unjust and commanded the unfreezing of assets. Nevertheless, the incident sent a clear message to human rights organizations nation-wide. It is therefore, perhaps, surprising how many human rights organizations are currently actively implementing P/CVE programs despite of the previously mentioned issues. While the P/CVE agenda commits to a human rights-based approach to preventing violent extremism, the often-times close involvement of security forces in the implementation of P/CVE also endangers the integrity of CSOs. I would argue, however, that P/CVE can and should also be understood as part of a pragmatic response by human rights organizations that engage in a difficult balancing act between shining light onto human rights violations and their own security. The close relationship with the government and security forces in the implementation of P/CVE seems to allow human rights organizations to expose certain incidents without feeling immediate repercussions. Additionally, at the coast, CSOs established a consortium to protect each other from similar accusations. Human rights organizations and other CSOs also contest the 2019 amendment of POTA that obliges all organizations that implement P/CVE to report information to the NCTC. They are thus forced to find a pragmatic path between dialogue with the security forces and protection of their own work.

Humanitarian and development programs are frequently also part of P/CVE responses in Kenya. Especially in the North-Eastern region of Kenya, humanitarian and development interventions converge with security strategies to tackle violent extremism. The climate crisis has led to the worst droughts and food emergency situation in forty years. The redirection of funding channels to European countries through the Ukraine war and global wheat price crisis also partly contribute to the lack of funding to address humanitarian needs in the region. Additionally, foreign actors often prioritize other countries as they consider Kenya as a middle-income country. Since P/CVE continues to be a funding priority for many donors in the North-Eastern region of Kenya, many local CSOs apply for P/CVE funding to allocate resources and later redirect them to humanitarian assistance programs. Local CSOs, in asserting their agency, therefore also take advantage of the P/CVE industry to access funding that they would otherwise not receive in a situation of humanitarian emergency.

Finally, peacebuilding CSOs in particular have shifted their focus to the implementation of P/CVE as a consequence of the huge donor funding supply for these programs, oftentimes using the labels of “P/CVE” and “peacebuilding” interchangeably. While both P/CVE and peacebuilding are very broadly defined terms, the label P/CVE raises a lot of suspicion in local communities and creates security risks for local aid workers who implement these programs. Nevertheless, P/CVE is also an instrument for local communities to keep security forces at arm’s length. Many P/CVE programs contain community policing as an integral element which redirects security governance to the local community. It appears that local communities are able to contain direct police engagement in the community, which decreases incidents of police brutality against youth. While many local peacebuilders explain how violent extremism actually is not a main concern in their communities, P/CVE seems to be an important tool to not only gain funding but again paradoxically help secure the community against government crackdowns.

Ultimately, local CSOs in Kenya demonstrate great pragmatism in the implementation of P/CVE by balancing security concerns and local needs within an increasingly competitive donor market. At the beginning, P/CVE might have been a top-down approach to tackle local insecurities that are of concern for international actors and global stability. While international security interests continue to hijack the ‘triple nexus’, local CSOs have used P/CVE to allocate and redirect resources to their own needs, secure their mission in the face of a shrinking civil society space, and protect themselves from direct security interventions.

April 11, 2023. Nora Naji, Visiting Scholar (AY 2022-2023)
Nora Naji is a PhD candidate at the University of Basel, and an associated researcher at swisspeace. Her dissertation ‘Commodifying peace: Intimate warfare and prevention economies in Kenya’ builds on the securitization premise and sets out to situate the agenda of “Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism” (P/CVE) in Kenya within a larger discussion of prevention economies.

This post reflects the opinions of the author and not necessarily the views of NYU, NYU Law or the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice.

Paving a Digital Road to Hell? A Primer on the Role of the World Bank and Global Networks in Promoting Digital ID

TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Paving a Digital Road to Hell? 

A Primer on the Role of the World Bank and Global Networks in Promoting Digital ID

Around the world, governments are enthusiastically adopting digital identification systems. In this 2022 report, we show how global actors, led by the World Bank, are energetically promoting such systems. They proclaim that digital ID will provide an indispensable foundation for an equitable, inclusive future. But a specific model of digital ID is being promoted—and a growing body of evidence shows that this model of digital ID is linked to large-scale human rights violations. In this report, we argue that, despite undoubted good intentions, this model of digital ID is failing to live up to its promises and may in fact be causing severe harm. As international development actors continue to promote and support digital ID rollouts, there is an urgent need to consider the full implications of these systems and to ensure that digital ID realizes rather than violates human rights.

In this report, we provide a carefully researched primer, as well as a call to action with practical recommendations. We first compile evidence from around the world, providing a rigorous overview of the impacts that digital ID systems have had on human rights across different contexts. We show that the implementation of the dominant model of digital ID is increasingly causing severe and large-scale human rights violations, especially since such systems may exacerbate pre-existing forms of exclusion from public and private services. The use of new technologies may also lead to new forms of harm, including biometric exclusion, discrimination along new cleavages, and the many harms associated with surveillance capitalism. Meanwhile, the promised benefits of such systems have not been convincingly proven. This primer draws on the work of experts and activists working across multiple fields to identify critical concerns and evidentiary gaps within this new development consensus on digital ID.

The report points specifically to the World Bank and its Identification for Development (ID4D) Initiative as playing a central role in the rapid proliferation of a particular model of digital ID, one that is heavily inspired by the Aadhaar system in India. Under this approach to digital ID, the aim is to provide individuals with a ‘transactional’ identity, rather than to engage with questions surrounding legal status and rights. We argue that a driving force behind the widespread and rapid adoption of such systems is a powerful new development consensus, which holds that digital ID can contribute to inclusive and sustainable development—and is even a prerequisite for the realization of human rights. This consensus is packaged and promoted by key global actors like the World Bank, as well as by governments, foundations, vendors and consulting firms. It is contributing to the proliferation of digital ID around the world, all while insufficient attention is paid to risks and necessary safeguards.

The report concludes by arguing for a shift in policy discussions around digital ID, including the need to open new critical conversations around the “Identification for Development Agenda,” and encourage greater discourse around the role of human rights in a digital age. We issue a call to action for civil society actors and human rights stakeholders, with practical suggestions for those in the human rights ecosystem to consider. The report sets out key questions that civil society can ask of governments and international development institutions, and specific asks that can be made—including demanding that processes be slowed down so that sufficient care is taken, and increasing transparency surrounding discussions about digital ID systems, among others—to ensure that human rights are safeguarded in the implementation of digital ID systems.

Can human rights provide a hopeful vision of a more equal future?

INEQUALITIES

Can human rights provide a hopeful vision of a more equal future?

Rampant inequality around the world has forced the international human rights community to confront a basic yet controversial question – what to do about it?

Two trees floating on water contrasting two different seasons alluding to prosperity and poverty.
Lightspring (shutterstock)

International human rights have struggled to provide satisfactory answers to poverty and inequality since their inception. From debates around the use of political means to address social issues in the aftermath of World War II, to more recent discussions on the false dichotomy between social justice and human rights, much has happened within the human rights field in terms of its engagement with socio-economic issues. Yet answers to the question of what a rights-based vision to end poverty and inequality could look like continue to prove elusive.

For much of the 20th century, progressive leaders and thinkers focused their message on the hopeful possibility of a better future. Workers rallied for better working conditions and women demonstrated for more freedoms and rights. Human rights provided a positive narrative on which to build these demands. Today, however, hopeful narratives about a brighter future no longer have the galvanizing effect they once had. Climate change is irreversible and political leadership is clearly not up to the task. Promised technological advancements have brought exclusion and precariousness in the gig economy. Undue privileging of pharma interests in political decisions has meant that COVID-19 vaccine distribution remains deeply unequal. The list keeps going, and yet the human rights community struggles to provide a positive, proactive vision of the future.

The pandemic has prompted many to call for a redesign of the economic system, and this has provided an opening for actors in the human rights field. The World Economic Forum, for example, argued for a “Great Reset,” an opportunity to “reimagine” the economy towards “stakeholder capitalism.” In this apolitical, conflict-less vision of the world, economic problems exist out there, in a vacuum, waiting for someone to solve them. Conflict can be resolved through a “social contract” and “agreement on shared values” between governments, businesses, and individuals. But can there be a social contract and an agreement on shared values while Jeff Bezos had “the best day ever” as he flew into space for $28 million, and the equivalent of 125 million people have lost their jobs since the start of the pandemic? Can there be “shared values” when the poorest half owns 2% of total wealth and the richest 10% own 76%?

Although there is now growing consensus that inequality is problematic in more ways than one, the question is whether human rights provide a positive, hopeful vision to end it. But, for this to happen, the human rights community must first face a prior, very basic question – what to do about it? Should human rights aim at eradicating inequalities or simply at “reducing” them? Even if we agree on what the goal is, how do we accomplish it? Do we reduce the number of poor or the number of billionaires?

These seemingly basic questions point at broader, generalized misunderstandings of the relationship between poverty and inequality that the human rights field has not fully solved yet.

Those with an interest in maintaining the status quo continue to spread damaging ideas that further entrench inequality based on the concepts of “meritocracy” and “trickle-down” economics. At their most basic, these fallacies argue that when those at the top are rewarded for their ability and effort, their high earnings will continue to incentivize them and will also benefit those at the bottom, notably in the form of jobs, higher wages, and better products. Following this, government policies should support the wealthy, including through tax breaks at the top, because they will somehow “trickle down” to the poor.

As it turns out, these beliefs are particularly present in countries where income inequality is highest. They are typically held by those who already see high inequality levels as legitimate, which is in turn typically stronger in individuals with higher incomes. The perceived gap between the poor and the rich in terms of their “merit” also happens to grow in more unequal societies, leading people to assume that inequality of income correlates strongly with inequality of merit. In other words, higher inequality levels lead those with higher incomes to perceive the poor as less “meritorious” and more deserving of their socioeconomic situation, and therefore to justify inequality on the basis of unequal merit.

Moreover, while higher inequality damages societies in their entirety, it harms some more than others. People in poverty and those on low incomes are particularly impacted by inequality. With higher inequality, their incomes decrease, their educational attainment drops, and their health worsens. In contrast, individuals on high incomes and wealth remain largely undisturbed by inequality. Their personal connections, used to access high-paying jobs, good quality schools, and top healthcare, endure.

And yet addressing inequality as a precondition for poverty eradication remains taboo. Charity towards the poor is perceived as a generally accepted response to poverty, whereas questioning inequality, which necessarily leads to questioning the legitimacy or appropriateness of top incomes and wealth accumulation, is still a political anathema.

The international human rights community can and should question these beliefs and provide a renewed hopeful vision of a more equal future. For that, looking at poverty from a human rights perspective must necessarily entail examining income and wealth concentration at both the bottom and the top – beginning with claiming tax justice, making social protection universal, demanding adequate funding for public services, and redefining what long-term public investments look like. The future of human rights largely depends on our ability, as human rights advocates, to develop an expertise in these topics, dispel damaging myths, and strategically infuse the language of rights and obligations within them.

May 25, 2022. Paula Fernandez-Wulff, Visiting Scholar (AY 2021-2022).
Paula Fernandez-Wulff is the Senior Advisor to the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights and Scholar in Residence, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law. 

This post reflects the opinions of the author and not necessarily the views of NYU, NYU Law or the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice. The views presented here should also not be attributed to the United Nations or any of its agencies.

Akapaman Tè An Ayiti Vyole Dwa Fanm Yo Epi Agrave Kriz Klimatik La, Deklare Òganizasyon K Ap Defann Dwa Yo

CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT

Akapaman Tè An Ayiti Vyole Dwa Fanm Yo Epi Agrave Kriz Klimatik La, Deklare Òganizasyon K Ap Defann Dwa Yo

Dokiman Global Justice Clinic nan NYU ak Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn depoze devan Rapòtè Espesyal Nasyonzini sou Vyolans Kont Fanm prezante konsekans dappiyanp sou tè ki fèt ak vyolans kont fanm nan Savane Diane

Español | English

Dappiyanp sou tè, avèk anpil vyolans ki lakoz deplasman fanm peyizan ki t ap travay latè nan Savane Diane se yon aksyon ki reprezante vyolans k ap fèt sou fanm epi ki agrave vilnerabilite klimatik la, se sa Global Justice Clinic ki nan Inivèsite New York ak Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn (SOFA) te di Rapòtè Espesyal Nasyonzini sou Vyolans Kont Fanm nan yon dokiman yo te depoze nan biwo li semenn pase a. Dappiyanp sou tè nan Savane Diane, ki mete SOFA deyò sou tè li te konn itilize pou anseye fanm teknik agrikòl ekolojik epi dirab, se youn nan egzanp pami tout lòt zak dappiyanp sou tè ki te fèt pandan dènye mwa sa yo. Dappiyanp sou tè an Ayiti ap ogmante pandan sistèm jistis la li menm pa genyen kapasite pou pote repons.

“Nou mande Rapòtè Espesyal la pou li panche sou pwoblèm nan paske nou pa rive jwenn jistis an Ayiti,” se deklarasyon Sharma Aurelien, ki se Direktris Egzekitif SOFA. “Tè sa te kontribye nan ede fanm yo konbat povrete epi nan enterè tout sosyete a” daprè sa li fè konnen.

An 2020, nèg ak zam itilize gwo ponyèt ak vyolans epi fòse manm SOFA kite tè a.  Se tè gouvènman ayisyen an te bay yo dwa pou yo menm sèlman itilize li. Plizyè manm SOFA te resevwa anpil kou anba men yo.  SOFA te aprann genyen yon konpayi ki nan Agwo-endistri ki rele Stevia Agro Industries S.A., ki t aprevandike li genyen tit pwopriyete pou tèren an pou yo kiltive ‘stevia’ pou voye vann lòtbò. Gouvènman ayisyen an te anile dwa li te bay SOFA a pou itilize tè a, san okenn pwosedi jidisyè, epi nan kòmansman ane 2021 an, ansyen Prezidan Jovenel Moïse, ki te la alepòk, fè tè a tounen yon zòn franch agwo-endistriyèl atravè yon dekrè egzekitif.

“Minis Agrikilti a mete tèt li nan plas jij pou pran pozisyon pou Stevia Industries epi pèmèt li kontinye aktivite yo pandan SOFA te resevwa lòd pou li kanpe sou aktivite pa li yo,”daprè Marie Frantz Joachim, ki se manm kòdinasyon nasyonal SOFA.

Nan dokiman enstitisyon yo te depoze a, yo souliye jan dappiyanp sou tè a agrave vyolasyon dwa yo. Sa agrave povrete a ak ensekirite alimantè nan zòn nan, epi fanm k ap chèche travay pou Stevia Industries yo ap fè fas ak esplwatasyon seksyèl epi ak moun ki vòlè salè yo. Dappiyanp sou tè vyole tou dwa pou abitan yo jwenn dlo, nan yon kontèks kote kriz klimatik la ap vin pi mal: nan 8600 ekta tè yo sezi yo pou pwodiksyon stevia a, genyen twa (3) rezèv dlo leta pwoteje.

“Nou pèdi rezèv dlo nou yo paske yo vin [pou konpayi] a kounya. Pandan tan sa a, nou ap viv yon gwo kriz dlo,”se deklarasyon Esther Jolissaint, ki se yon manm SOFA ki afekte nan Savane Diane.

Chanjman klimatik, dappiyanp sou tè ak vyolans kont fanm se plizyè fenomèn ki makonnen youn ak lòt, daprè sa enstitisyon yo fè konnen. Yo toujou rekonèt Ayiti kòm youn nan senk (5) peyi ki pi afekte akoz kriz klimatik la. Dappiyanp sou tè se petèt alafwa rezilta vilnerabilite klimatik la ak ensifizans resous yo, menm jan tou dappiyanp sou tè a kapab agrave vilnerabilite klimatik la, paske tè agrikòl vin pi ra chak jou pi plis pandan y ap itilize yo pou fè monokilti oubyen pou lòt aktivite endistriyèl ki ap degrade anviwònman an. Fanm yo pi ekspoze nan sitiyasyon sa.

“Dwa pou fanm nan zòn riral yo jwenn tè ak resous agrikòl se yon bagay ki fondamantal pou garanti dwa yo genyen kòm moun, epi sipòte rezilyans klimatik la,” daprè Sienna Merope-Synge, ki se Ko-Direktris Inisyativ Jistis Klimatik nan Karayib la nan GJC. Yo dwe rekonèt dappiyanp sou tè ki fèt kont fanm kòm yon fòm vyolans kont fanm,” selon sa li kontinye pou li di.

Dokiman sa a ki depoze nan tèt kole ant enstitisyon yo, konsantre li sou apèl SOFA lanse pou genyen reparasyon ak restitisyon pou fanm ki afekte akoz dappiyanp tè sa. Li prezante tou apèl SOFA ak mouvman sosyal Ayisyen yo lanse pou genyen pi gwo pwoteksyon sou dwa pou peyizan genyen tè, nan moman kominote riral yo ap fè fas ak ogmantasyon ka dappiyanp sou tè k ap fèt nan peyi a. Kominote entènasyonal la dwe panche plis sou pwoblèm nan epi denonse li, daprè sa enstitisyon yo fè konnen. “Nou ap mande solidarite bò kote lòt moun ki angaje yo nan batay mondyal ki genyen pou garanti respè dwa moun,” daprè sa Aurelien fini pou li di.

Pòs sa a te pibliye kòm yon lage laprès sou 5 avril 2022.

Pòs sa a reflete deklarasyon Global Justice Clinic la epi li pa nesesèman opinyon NYU, NYU Law, oswa Center for Human Rights and Global Justice.

Acaparamiento De Tierras En Haití Viola Los Derechos De Las Mujeres Y Profundiza La Crisis Climática, Explican Grupos De Derechos

CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT

Acaparamiento De Tierras En Haití Viola Los Derechos De Las Mujeres Y Profundiza La Crisis Climática, Explican Grupos De Derechos

La sumisión de la Clínica de Justicia Global de NYU y Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn a la Relatora Especial de la ONU sobre la violencia contra la mujer subraya las consecuencias del acaparamiento violento de tierras contra las mujeres en Savane Diane, Haití 

English | Kreyòl

Un acaparamiento violenta de tierras desplazó a mujeres agricultoras en Savane Diane, Haití y constituyó violencia de género y ha agravado la vulnerabilidad a los cambios de clima, según la sumisión que la Clínica de Justicia Global de NYU y Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn (SOFA) le presentaron a la Relatora Especial de la ONU sobre la violencia contra la mujer tarde la semana pasada. El acaparamiento de tierra en Savane Diane, el cual le quitó tierra usada por SOFA para educar a mujeres en técnicas agrícolas más ecológicamente sostenibles, es sólo uno de varios ejemplos de tal acaparamiento en los últimos meses. Acaparamientos de tierra están aumentando en Haití, mientras el poder judicial haitiano no ha respondido.

“Solicitamos la atención de la Relatora Especial porque no hemos podido garantizar la justicia en Haití,” dijo Sharma Aurelien, la directora ejecutiva de SOFA. “Esta tierra ayudó a las mujeres a combatir la pobreza y benefició a toda la sociedad,” ella continuó.

En 2020, hombres armados violentamente echaron a los miembros de SOFA de las tierras sobre cuales el gobierno haitiano les había otorgado derechos exclusivos de uso. En el proceso, golpearon brutalmente a algunos. Desde ese entonces, SOFA se ha enterado que la empresa agroindustrial, Stevia Agroindustrias S.A., estaba reclamando título del área para cultivar stevia para exportación. El gobierno haitiano revocó los derechos de SOFA a la tierra, sin ningún proceso judicial, y, en principios del 2021, el difunto presidente, Jovenel Moïse, convirtió la tierra en una zona franca agroindustrial por decreto ejecutivo.

“El Ministro de Agricultura asumió el papel de juez, apoyando a Industrias Stevia y permitiendo que continúen con sus actividades mientras que SOFA fue ordenada a suspender las nuestras,” dijo Marie Frantz Joachim, miembro del comité coordinadora.

La sumisión de las organizaciones enfatizó la violación de los derechos conjuntos ocasionada por la apropiación de la tierra. Esto está profundizando la pobreza e inseguridad alimenticia en la zona, y las mujeres que trabajan con las Industrias Stevia han sufrido explotación sexual y robo de salarios. El acaparamiento también vulnera el derecho al agua durante esta misma crisis climática: los terrenos incautados incluyen tres reservorios de agua protegidos por el Estado.

“Perdimos nuestras reservas de agua porque ya le pertenecen a [la compañía]. Mientras tanto, estamos sufriendo una gran crisis de agua,” dijo Esther Jolissaint, miembro de SOFA afectado en Savane Diane.

El cambio climático, el acaparamiento de tierras, y la violencia contra las mujeres son fenómenos interconectados, explican las organizaciones. Haití frecuentemente está listado como uno de los cinco países más afectados por el cambio climático. El acaparamiento de tierras puede resultar de la vulnerabilidad climática, y también puede contribuir a ella, ya que las tierras agrícolas, cada vez más escasas, se convierten en monocultivos agrícolas que degraden el medio ambiente. Las mujeres son particularmente vulnerables.

“Los derechos a la tierra de las mujeres rurales y el acceso a los recursos agrícolas son esenciales para garantizar sus derechos humanos y apoyar la resiliencia climática,” dijo Sienna Merope-Synge, la codirectora de la Iniciativa de Justicia Climática del Caribe de la Clínica de Justicia Global. “El acaparamiento de tierras contra las mujeres debería ser reconocido como una forma de violencia de género,” ella continuó.

La sumisión conjunta enfatiza el llamado de SOFA por reparaciones y restitución para las mujeres afectadas por el acaparamiento de tierras. También destaca el llamado de SOFA y movimientos sociales haitianos para una mayor protección de los derechos de los campesinos a la tierra, ya que las comunidades rurales en Haití han notado un aumento en el acaparamiento de sus tierras. Las organizaciones explican que se necesita más atención y condenación internacional. “Estamos pidiendo la solidaridad de otros comprometidos en la lucha mundial por el respeto de los derechos humanos,” concluyó Aurelien.

Este post fue publicado originalmente como un comunicado de prensa abril 5, 2022.

Este post refleja la declaración de la Global Justice Clinic, y no necesariamente las opiniones de NYU, NYU Law, o de el Center for Human Rights and Global Justice.

Chosen by a Secret Algorithm: Colombia’s top-down pandemic payments

TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Chosen by a Secret Algorithm: Colombia’s top-down pandemic payments

The Colombian government was applauded for delivering payments to 2.9 million people in just 2 weeks during the pandemic, thanks to a big-data-driven approach. But this new approach represents a fundamental change in social policy which shifts away from political participation and from a notion of rights.

On Wednesday, November 24, 2021, the Digital Welfare State and Human Rights Project hosted the ninth episode in the Transformer States conversation series on Digital Government and Human Rights, in an event entitled: “Chosen by a secret algorithm: A closer look at Colombia’s Pandemic Payments.” Christiaan van Veen and Victoria Adelmant had a conversation with Joan López, Researcher at the Global Data Justice Initiative and at Colombian NGO Fundación Karisma about Colombia’s pandemic payments and its reliance on data-driven technologies and prediction. This blog highlights some core issues related to taking a top-down, data-driven approach to social protection.

From expert interviews to a top-down approach

The System of Possible Beneficiaries of Social Programs (SISBEN in Spanish) was created to assist in the targeting of social programs in Colombia. This system classifies the Colombian population along a spectrum of vulnerability through the collection of information about households, including health data, family composition, access to social programs, financial information, and earnings. This data is collected through nationwide interviews conducted by experts. Beneficiaries are then rated on a scale of 1 to 100, with 0 as the least prosperous and 100 as the most prosperous, through a simple algorithm. SISBEN therefore aims to identify and rank “the poorest of the poor.” This centralized classification system is used by 19 different social programs to determine eligibility: each social program chooses its own cut-off score between 1 and 100 as a threshold for eligibility.

But in 2016, the National Development Office – the Colombian entity in charge of SISBEN – changed the calculation used to determine the profile of the poorest. It introduced a new and secret algorithm which would create a profile based on predicted income generation capacity. Experts collecting data for SISBEN through interviews had previously looked at the realities of people’s conditions: if a person had access to basic services such as water, sanitation, education, health and/or employment, the person was not deemed poor. But the new system sought instead to create detailed profiles about what a person could earn, rather than what a person has. This approach sought, through modelling, to predict households’ situation, rather than to document beneficiaries’ realities.

A new approach to social policy

During the pandemic, the government launched a new system of payments called the Ingreso Solidario (meaning “solidarity income”). This system would provide monthly payments to people who were not covered by any other existing social program that relied on SISBEN; the ultimate goal of Ingreso Solidario was to send money to 2.9 million people who needed assistance due to the crisis caused by COVID-19. The Ingreso Solidario was, in some ways, very effective. People did not have to apply for this program: if they were selected as eligible, they would automatically receive a payment. Many people received the money immediately into their bank accounts, and payments were made very rapidly, within just a few weeks. Moreover, the Ingreso Solidario was an unconditional transfer and did not condition the receipt of the money to the fulfillment of certain requirements.

But the Ingreso Solidario was based on a new approach to social policy, driven by technology and data sharing. The Government entered agreements with private companies, including Experian and Transunion, to access their databases. Agreements were also made between different government agencies and departments. Through data-sharing arrangements across 34 public and private databases, the government cross- checked the information provided in the interviews with information in dozens of databases to find inconsistencies and exclude anyone deemed not to require social assistance. In relying on cross-checking databases to “find” people who are in need, this approach depends heavily on enormous data collection, and it increases government’s reliance on the private sector.

The implications of this new approach

This new approach to social policy, as implemented through the Ingreso Solidario, has fundamental implications. First, this system is difficult to challenge. The algorithm used to profile vulnerability, to predict income generating capacity, and to assign a score to people living in poverty, is confidential. The Government consistently argued that disclosing information about the algorithm would lead to a macroeconomic crisis because if people knew how the system worked, they would try to cheat the system. Additionally, SISBEN has been normalized. Though there are many other ways that eligibility for social programs could be assessed, the public accepts it as natural and inevitable that the government has taken this arbitrary approach reliant on numerical scoring and predictions. Due to this normalization, combined with the lack of transparency, this new approach to determining eligibility for social programs has therefore not been contested.

Second, in adopting an approach which relies on cross-checking and analyzing data, the Ingreso Solidario is designed to avoid any contestation in the design and implementation of the algorithm. This is a thoroughly technocratic endeavor. The idea is to use databases and avoid going to, and working with, the communities. The government was, in Joan’s words, “trying to control everything from a distance” to “avoid having political discussions about who should be eligible.” There were no discussions and negotiations between the citizens and the Government to jointly address the challenges of using this technology to target poor people. Decisions about who the extra 2.9 million beneficiaries should be were taken unilaterally from above. As Joan argued, this was intentional: “The mindset of avoiding political discussion is clearly part of the idea of Ingreso Solidario.”

Third, because people were unaware that they were going to receive money, those who received a payment felt like they had won the lottery. Thus, as Joan argued, people saw this money not “as an entitlement, but just as a gift that this person was lucky to get.” This therefore represents a shift away from a conception of assistance as something we are entitled to by right. But in re-centering the notion of rights, we are reminded of the importance of taking human rights seriously when analyzing and redesigning these kinds of systems. Joan noted that we need to move away from an approach of deciding what poverty is from above, and instead move towards working with communities. We must use fundamental rights as guidance in designing a system that will provide support to those in poverty in an open, transparent, and participatory manner which does not seek to bypass political discussion.

María Beatriz Jiménez, LLM program, NYU School of Law with research focus on digital rights. She previously worked for the Colombian government in the Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies and the Ministry of Trade.