What are post-PACT Act possibilities for recognition and compensation of Iraqi victims of war toxins?

PREVENTION AND CONFLICT

What are post-PACT Act possibilities for recognition and compensation for Iraqi victims of war toxins?

The US PACT Act, enacted in 2022, offers unprecedented healthcare and compensation for 3.5 million US military veterans suffering from illnesses linked to toxic exposure. What are the possibilities for comparable recognition and support for Iraqi civilians who continue to live amidst the same war toxins, and what role can international law play in achieving justice?

With the discomfort of the first morning approaching and the heat slowly raising, the sand had picked up with the wind and started to attack us. Though if you notice, nobody stopped, people kept going on. An army personal is seen in this image, helping to guide and protect from any threats, this would be along the whole journey and into the city of Karbala itself.
Jaffer Hasan (iStock)

April 2023 marks eight months since the PACT Act (Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics Act) went into effect in the United States in August 2022. The PACT Act is “the most significant law ever helping victims exposed to toxic burn pits,” as described in US President Joe Biden’s February 2023 State of the Union address. Indeed, the PACT Act unprecedentedly offers healthcare and disability compensation for approximately 3.5 million veterans harmed by burn pits and other toxic exposures. It not only promises long awaited compensation for veterans who served in the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan beginning in 2003 and 2001 respectively, but also covers veterans harmed by herbicides during the Vietnam War, 1990–91 Gulf War veterans, and those who served in numerous other locations including Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and many more. Veterans will be presumed eligible according to dates and locations of service, and no longer have to prove the direct link between their exposure and their illness, often an impossible task.

No comparable mechanism is in place, however, to recognize and assist civilians facing ongoing toxic assaults in contaminated environments, including in Iraq. Iraqi civilians suffer from disturbingly high rates of congenital anomalies (birth defects) and cancers, leading to conditions of inescapable health devastation, something I deem “toxic saturation” in my research.

Does the PACT Act offer any hope for comparable support for non-US civilians? Or does the Act represent the latest iteration of a deeply flawed approach when it comes to the US’s response to victims of war toxins? In this post, I address these questions as they impact Iraqi civilians, and examine international law’s role for addressing irreparable harm experienced by civilians forcibly exposed to war toxins.

The Scale of “Toxic Saturation”

A 2019 Environmental Pollution study documented that children living in proximity to a US military base near Nasiriyah, Iraq, had an increased likelihood of congenital anomalies including neural tube defects (such as spina bifida, anencephaly, and hydrocephalus), congenital heart diseases, and musculoskeletal malformations (including missing right hand and paralyzed clubfoot). Doctors in Fallujah have long reported a staggering post-2003 surge in birth defects.

It is important to understand the scale of war toxins that the US military and its allies introduced to Iraq. More than 780,000 rounds of depleted uranium (DU) were used in 1991, and more than 300,000 rounds in 2003, as reported by Dutch peace organization PAX. As explained by the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), “DU is a potential health hazard if it enters the body, such as through embedded fragments, contaminated wounds, and inhalation or ingestion.”

The US military admits to using white phosphorus as an incendiary weapon in Fallujah in 2004. Incendiary weapons, as explained by Human Rights Watch (HRW), “produce heat and fire through the chemical reaction of a flammable substance, cause excruciating burns and destroy homes and other civilian structures.” The US later used white phosphorus again in Iraq and Syria in operations targeting the Islamic State. As described by HRW’s Stephen Goose, “No matter how white phosphorus is used, it poses a high risk of horrific and long lasting harm in crowded cities like Raqqa and Mosul and any other areas with concentrations of civilians.”

Another key source of toxic exposure for veterans is burn pits. As I wrote for Al Jazeera in August 2022, burn pits are open air pits of military waste, sometimes as large as football fields, used to burn and destroy weapons, chemicals, plastics, and medical and human waste, typically using jet fuel. Joe Biden has been vocal about his son Beau’s fatal brain cancer, believed to be caused by exposure to burn pits while serving with the US military in Iraq and working in Kosovo.

International Law and Compensation for Health Destruction

Compensation is essential for providing medical care and lifetime assistance to Iraqis struggling to survive due to toxic saturation. Veterans have faced health devastation following relatively short-term exposure, while civilians have been left behind to languish amidst war toxins. As noted in my research on water access, however, international law faces significant enforceability challenges regarding reparations for victims of environmental destruction in the context of armed conflict.

The US in particular has a discouraging track record. The US government long denied illnesses linked to deadly, dioxin-containing herbicides, including Agent Orange, experienced by Vietnam War veterans. Funding dedicated to Vietnamese civilians and environmental clean-up has been a mere fraction of what is needed, especially as children continue to be born with severe congenital anomalies nearly fifty years after the Vietnam War ended in 1975.

In principle, international law clearly provides the basis for reparations for Iraqi civilians. Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions addresses the illegality of environmental damage and health destruction, and reparations for harm caused. Article 55 requires that care is taken in warfare “to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage.” This protection prohibits methods “which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.” Article 91 states that parties that violate international humanitarian law shall “be liable to pay compensation.” The Environmental Modification Convention forbids military “environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury.”

Furthermore, monetary compensation is not the only aspect of reparations currently being denied for Iraqis. As Christine Evans writes, “There is a common misconception that reparations are synonymous with monetary compensation” when reparations actually encompass financial and non-financial meanings: “restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction (disclosure of the truth), and guarantees of non repetition.”

Following the significant agreement on “loss and damage” funding at COP27 in November 2022, compensation for developing countries impacted by climate disasters, long on the agenda of climate justice advocates, was brought to the center of the world stage, though much work remains to be done to ensure compensation is provided to those in need of it.

Comprehensive environmental justice requires that all victims of environmental injustice, including both victims of the climate crisis and of toxic environmental assaults during and following war, are recognized and compensated. The PACT Act is an overdue victory for veterans and sets a precedent for compensation following wartime toxic exposure. The US government cannot stop here, only recognizing veterans affected by war toxins. The US must be pressured to acknowledge the existence and suffering of Iraqi civilians and all people harmed by war toxins, and to provide the care and compensation that is owed to them.

April 21, 2023. Carly A. Krakow, Visiting Scholar (AY 2022-2023)
Carly A. Krakow is a writer, journalist, faculty member at the NYU Gallatin School, and completing her PhD in International Law at the London School of Economics as a Judge Rosalyn Higgins Scholar and Modern Law Review Scholar. 

This post reflects the opinions of the author and not necessarily the views of NYU, NYU Law or the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice.

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April 21, 2023 Youssef Farhat Post  

Prevention economies in Kenya: Peace, Power & Pragmatism?

PREVENTION AND CONFLICT

Prevention economies in Kenya: Peace, Power and Pragmatism?

While international security interests continue to hijack the ‘triple nexus’, local CSOs have used Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) to allocate and redirect resources to their own needs, secure their mission in the face of a shrinking civil society space, and protect themselves from direct security interventions.

Golden Brown (iStock)

The Emergence of the ‘Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism’ Agenda

“Conflict prevention” is an umbrella term for a variety of interventions in the peacebuilding field that aim at addressing factors that could lead to violent conflict. SDG 16 in the UN 2030 agenda makes an important contribution to the realm of conflict prevention with the target goal to “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.” After years of hard counter-terrorism strategies, preventive measures to address the root causes of radicalization have also gained traction in the Global War on Terror. The United States, supported by the United Nations, have played a central role in this paradigm shift and the introduction of the concept ‘Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism’ (P/CVE), which replaced the dominant notion of ‘Counter-Terrorism’ (CT) in policy spaces in 2015. P/CVE has since become the globally accepted security strategy to address violent extremism, by underscoring a whole-of-society approach, as well as the localization of the fight against terrorism. While P/CVE is very much a security strategy, the agenda is now also closely linked to SDG 16 through the emphasis on strengthening civil society and government institutions, building social cohesion and resilience, addressing local grievances and respecting human rights. At the core of this union between P/CVE as a security strategy and peacebuilding lies the concept of ‘human security’, which is defined by the UNDP as ‘freedom of want’ and ‘freedom of fear’. ‘Human security’ focuses on the individual grievances that may incite violence. Consequently, many security approaches are no longer solely based on military power, but include humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding initiatives. Within this vein, CSOs have thus become integral to the realization of the agenda. As a result, critics argue that P/CVE has securitized and co-opted the civil society space, thereby forging a dangerous liaison between security actors and CSOs.

Securitization of the Civil Society Space in Kenya

In the first years, after its global adoption in 2015, the P/CVE agenda was implemented through National Action Plans (NAPs) with great enthusiasm from the international community. Particularly, the United States supported its allies around the world in the adoption of the agenda through technical assistance and donor funding. Kenya is one of the US’s main strategic allies in the Global War on Terror in Africa and has been at the forefront of adopting the P/CVE agenda in the last 7 years. While donors decreased their funding through COVID-19 and the presidential election in 2022, P/CVE is still one of the main donor priorities in Kenya to this day. Since the introduction of P/CVE in 2016 through a National Action Plan (NAP), many CSOs have geared towards the implementation of P/CVE programs to access funding for their programs. The international donor industry, which is heavily influenced by security interests in the Horn of Africa, has thus very much impacted the civil society space in Kenya. As the Kenyan government considers violent extremism a national security issue, every organization that implements P/CVE must report to the National Center for Counterterrorism (NCTC) under the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) since a 2019 amendment. CSOs therefore have to report to the authorities about P/CVE programs, which can include sensitive information about the program participants. As a consequence, local communities have accused CSOs of espionage and surveillance, thereby criticizing the alignment of aid programs with security interventions. While the securitization of the civil society space in Kenya through the integration of security strategies into aid programs in the name of prevention has certainly led to many trust issues between CSOs and local communities, the question of agency and resistance of CSOs is central in understanding P/CVE in Kenya. CSOs are subject to complex negotiations between international security agendas, funding scarcity, and local agency. I will briefly discuss the entanglement of the security-oriented P/CVE agenda in three key areas in the aid architecture: human rights (1), humanitarian and development aid (2), and peacebuilding (3).

The Entanglement of P/CVE with the Aid Architecture

In the aftermath of heavy security crackdowns against Muslim communities after the Westgate mall attack in 2013 and counter-terrorism operations along the coast, Kenyan human rights organizations were very vocal about the human rights violations including forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings committed by Kenyan security forces and brought international attention onto the situation. As a response, the government listed two leading human rights organizations as terrorist entities which resulted in the freezing of their bank accounts. After a legal battle the court finally ruled the accusation as unjust and commanded the unfreezing of assets. Nevertheless, the incident sent a clear message to human rights organizations nation-wide. It is therefore, perhaps, surprising how many human rights organizations are currently actively implementing P/CVE programs despite of the previously mentioned issues. While the P/CVE agenda commits to a human rights-based approach to preventing violent extremism, the often-times close involvement of security forces in the implementation of P/CVE also endangers the integrity of CSOs. I would argue, however, that P/CVE can and should also be understood as part of a pragmatic response by human rights organizations that engage in a difficult balancing act between shining light onto human rights violations and their own security. The close relationship with the government and security forces in the implementation of P/CVE seems to allow human rights organizations to expose certain incidents without feeling immediate repercussions. Additionally, at the coast, CSOs established a consortium to protect each other from similar accusations. Human rights organizations and other CSOs also contest the 2019 amendment of POTA that obliges all organizations that implement P/CVE to report information to the NCTC. They are thus forced to find a pragmatic path between dialogue with the security forces and protection of their own work.

Humanitarian and development programs are frequently also part of P/CVE responses in Kenya. Especially in the North-Eastern region of Kenya, humanitarian and development interventions converge with security strategies to tackle violent extremism. The climate crisis has led to the worst droughts and food emergency situation in forty years. The redirection of funding channels to European countries through the Ukraine war and global wheat price crisis also partly contribute to the lack of funding to address humanitarian needs in the region. Additionally, foreign actors often prioritize other countries as they consider Kenya as a middle-income country. Since P/CVE continues to be a funding priority for many donors in the North-Eastern region of Kenya, many local CSOs apply for P/CVE funding to allocate resources and later redirect them to humanitarian assistance programs. Local CSOs, in asserting their agency, therefore also take advantage of the P/CVE industry to access funding that they would otherwise not receive in a situation of humanitarian emergency.

Finally, peacebuilding CSOs in particular have shifted their focus to the implementation of P/CVE as a consequence of the huge donor funding supply for these programs, oftentimes using the labels of “P/CVE” and “peacebuilding” interchangeably. While both P/CVE and peacebuilding are very broadly defined terms, the label P/CVE raises a lot of suspicion in local communities and creates security risks for local aid workers who implement these programs. Nevertheless, P/CVE is also an instrument for local communities to keep security forces at arm’s length. Many P/CVE programs contain community policing as an integral element which redirects security governance to the local community. It appears that local communities are able to contain direct police engagement in the community, which decreases incidents of police brutality against youth. While many local peacebuilders explain how violent extremism actually is not a main concern in their communities, P/CVE seems to be an important tool to not only gain funding but again paradoxically help secure the community against government crackdowns.

Ultimately, local CSOs in Kenya demonstrate great pragmatism in the implementation of P/CVE by balancing security concerns and local needs within an increasingly competitive donor market. At the beginning, P/CVE might have been a top-down approach to tackle local insecurities that are of concern for international actors and global stability. While international security interests continue to hijack the ‘triple nexus’, local CSOs have used P/CVE to allocate and redirect resources to their own needs, secure their mission in the face of a shrinking civil society space, and protect themselves from direct security interventions.

April 11, 2023. Nora Naji, Visiting Scholar (AY 2022-2023)
Nora Naji is a PhD candidate at the University of Basel, and an associated researcher at swisspeace. Her dissertation ‘Commodifying peace: Intimate warfare and prevention economies in Kenya’ builds on the securitization premise and sets out to situate the agenda of “Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism” (P/CVE) in Kenya within a larger discussion of prevention economies.

This post reflects the opinions of the author and not necessarily the views of NYU, NYU Law or the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice.

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April 11, 2023 Youssef Farhat Post  

Paving a Digital Road to Hell? A Primer on the Role of the World Bank and Global Networks in Promoting Digital ID

TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Paving a Digital Road to Hell? 

A Primer on the Role of the World Bank and Global Networks in Promoting Digital ID

Around the world, governments are enthusiastically adopting digital identification systems. In this 2022 report, we show how global actors, led by the World Bank, are energetically promoting such systems. They proclaim that digital ID will provide an indispensable foundation for an equitable, inclusive future. But a specific model of digital ID is being promoted—and a growing body of evidence shows that this model of digital ID is linked to large-scale human rights violations. In this report, we argue that, despite undoubted good intentions, this model of digital ID is failing to live up to its promises and may in fact be causing severe harm. As international development actors continue to promote and support digital ID rollouts, there is an urgent need to consider the full implications of these systems and to ensure that digital ID realizes rather than violates human rights.

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In this report, we provide a carefully researched primer, as well as a call to action with practical recommendations. We first compile evidence from around the world, providing a rigorous overview of the impacts that digital ID systems have had on human rights across different contexts. We show that the implementation of the dominant model of digital ID is increasingly causing severe and large-scale human rights violations, especially since such systems may exacerbate pre-existing forms of exclusion from public and private services. The use of new technologies may also lead to new forms of harm, including biometric exclusion, discrimination along new cleavages, and the many harms associated with surveillance capitalism. Meanwhile, the promised benefits of such systems have not been convincingly proven. This primer draws on the work of experts and activists working across multiple fields to identify critical concerns and evidentiary gaps within this new development consensus on digital ID.

The report points specifically to the World Bank and its Identification for Development (ID4D) Initiative as playing a central role in the rapid proliferation of a particular model of digital ID, one that is heavily inspired by the Aadhaar system in India. Under this approach to digital ID, the aim is to provide individuals with a ‘transactional’ identity, rather than to engage with questions surrounding legal status and rights. We argue that a driving force behind the widespread and rapid adoption of such systems is a powerful new development consensus, which holds that digital ID can contribute to inclusive and sustainable development—and is even a prerequisite for the realization of human rights. This consensus is packaged and promoted by key global actors like the World Bank, as well as by governments, foundations, vendors and consulting firms. It is contributing to the proliferation of digital ID around the world, all while insufficient attention is paid to risks and necessary safeguards.

The report concludes by arguing for a shift in policy discussions around digital ID, including the need to open new critical conversations around the “Identification for Development Agenda,” and encourage greater discourse around the role of human rights in a digital age. We issue a call to action for civil society actors and human rights stakeholders, with practical suggestions for those in the human rights ecosystem to consider. The report sets out key questions that civil society can ask of governments and international development institutions, and specific asks that can be made—including demanding that processes be slowed down so that sufficient care is taken, and increasing transparency surrounding discussions about digital ID systems, among others—to ensure that human rights are safeguarded in the implementation of digital ID systems.

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June 1, 2022 Youssef Farhat Uncategorized  

Can human rights provide a hopeful vision of a more equal future?

INEQUALITIES

Can human rights provide a hopeful vision of a more equal future?

Rampant inequality around the world has forced the international human rights community to confront a basic yet controversial question – what to do about it?

Two trees floating on water contrasting two different seasons alluding to prosperity and poverty.
Lightspring (shutterstock)

International human rights have struggled to provide satisfactory answers to poverty and inequality since their inception. From debates around the use of political means to address social issues in the aftermath of World War II, to more recent discussions on the false dichotomy between social justice and human rights, much has happened within the human rights field in terms of its engagement with socio-economic issues. Yet answers to the question of what a rights-based vision to end poverty and inequality could look like continue to prove elusive.

For much of the 20th century, progressive leaders and thinkers focused their message on the hopeful possibility of a better future. Workers rallied for better working conditions and women demonstrated for more freedoms and rights. Human rights provided a positive narrative on which to build these demands. Today, however, hopeful narratives about a brighter future no longer have the galvanizing effect they once had. Climate change is irreversible and political leadership is clearly not up to the task. Promised technological advancements have brought exclusion and precariousness in the gig economy. Undue privileging of pharma interests in political decisions has meant that COVID-19 vaccine distribution remains deeply unequal. The list keeps going, and yet the human rights community struggles to provide a positive, proactive vision of the future.

The pandemic has prompted many to call for a redesign of the economic system, and this has provided an opening for actors in the human rights field. The World Economic Forum, for example, argued for a “Great Reset,” an opportunity to “reimagine” the economy towards “stakeholder capitalism.” In this apolitical, conflict-less vision of the world, economic problems exist out there, in a vacuum, waiting for someone to solve them. Conflict can be resolved through a “social contract” and “agreement on shared values” between governments, businesses, and individuals. But can there be a social contract and an agreement on shared values while Jeff Bezos had “the best day ever” as he flew into space for $28 million, and the equivalent of 125 million people have lost their jobs since the start of the pandemic? Can there be “shared values” when the poorest half owns 2% of total wealth and the richest 10% own 76%?

Although there is now growing consensus that inequality is problematic in more ways than one, the question is whether human rights provide a positive, hopeful vision to end it. But, for this to happen, the human rights community must first face a prior, very basic question – what to do about it? Should human rights aim at eradicating inequalities or simply at “reducing” them? Even if we agree on what the goal is, how do we accomplish it? Do we reduce the number of poor or the number of billionaires?

These seemingly basic questions point at broader, generalized misunderstandings of the relationship between poverty and inequality that the human rights field has not fully solved yet.

Those with an interest in maintaining the status quo continue to spread damaging ideas that further entrench inequality based on the concepts of “meritocracy” and “trickle-down” economics. At their most basic, these fallacies argue that when those at the top are rewarded for their ability and effort, their high earnings will continue to incentivize them and will also benefit those at the bottom, notably in the form of jobs, higher wages, and better products. Following this, government policies should support the wealthy, including through tax breaks at the top, because they will somehow “trickle down” to the poor.

As it turns out, these beliefs are particularly present in countries where income inequality is highest. They are typically held by those who already see high inequality levels as legitimate, which is in turn typically stronger in individuals with higher incomes. The perceived gap between the poor and the rich in terms of their “merit” also happens to grow in more unequal societies, leading people to assume that inequality of income correlates strongly with inequality of merit. In other words, higher inequality levels lead those with higher incomes to perceive the poor as less “meritorious” and more deserving of their socioeconomic situation, and therefore to justify inequality on the basis of unequal merit.

Moreover, while higher inequality damages societies in their entirety, it harms some more than others. People in poverty and those on low incomes are particularly impacted by inequality. With higher inequality, their incomes decrease, their educational attainment drops, and their health worsens. In contrast, individuals on high incomes and wealth remain largely undisturbed by inequality. Their personal connections, used to access high-paying jobs, good quality schools, and top healthcare, endure.

And yet addressing inequality as a precondition for poverty eradication remains taboo. Charity towards the poor is perceived as a generally accepted response to poverty, whereas questioning inequality, which necessarily leads to questioning the legitimacy or appropriateness of top incomes and wealth accumulation, is still a political anathema.

The international human rights community can and should question these beliefs and provide a renewed hopeful vision of a more equal future. For that, looking at poverty from a human rights perspective must necessarily entail examining income and wealth concentration at both the bottom and the top – beginning with claiming tax justice, making social protection universal, demanding adequate funding for public services, and redefining what long-term public investments look like. The future of human rights largely depends on our ability, as human rights advocates, to develop an expertise in these topics, dispel damaging myths, and strategically infuse the language of rights and obligations within them.

May 25, 2022. Paula Fernandez-Wulff, Visiting Scholar (AY 2021-2022).
Paula Fernandez-Wulff is the Senior Advisor to the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights and Scholar in Residence, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law. 

This post reflects the opinions of the author and not necessarily the views of NYU, NYU Law or the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice. The views presented here should also not be attributed to the United Nations or any of its agencies.

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May 25, 2022 Youssef Farhat Post  

Akapaman Tè An Ayiti Vyole Dwa Fanm Yo Epi Agrave Kriz Klimatik La, Deklare Òganizasyon K Ap Defann Dwa Yo

CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT

Akapaman Tè An Ayiti Vyole Dwa Fanm Yo Epi Agrave Kriz Klimatik La, Deklare Òganizasyon K Ap Defann Dwa Yo

Dokiman Global Justice Clinic nan NYU ak Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn depoze devan Rapòtè Espesyal Nasyonzini sou Vyolans Kont Fanm prezante konsekans dappiyanp sou tè ki fèt ak vyolans kont fanm nan Savane Diane

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Dappiyanp sou tè, avèk anpil vyolans ki lakoz deplasman fanm peyizan ki t ap travay latè nan Savane Diane se yon aksyon ki reprezante vyolans k ap fèt sou fanm epi ki agrave vilnerabilite klimatik la, se sa Global Justice Clinic ki nan Inivèsite New York ak Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn (SOFA) te di Rapòtè Espesyal Nasyonzini sou Vyolans Kont Fanm nan yon dokiman yo te depoze nan biwo li semenn pase a. Dappiyanp sou tè nan Savane Diane, ki mete SOFA deyò sou tè li te konn itilize pou anseye fanm teknik agrikòl ekolojik epi dirab, se youn nan egzanp pami tout lòt zak dappiyanp sou tè ki te fèt pandan dènye mwa sa yo. Dappiyanp sou tè an Ayiti ap ogmante pandan sistèm jistis la li menm pa genyen kapasite pou pote repons.

“Nou mande Rapòtè Espesyal la pou li panche sou pwoblèm nan paske nou pa rive jwenn jistis an Ayiti,” se deklarasyon Sharma Aurelien, ki se Direktris Egzekitif SOFA. “Tè sa te kontribye nan ede fanm yo konbat povrete epi nan enterè tout sosyete a” daprè sa li fè konnen.

An 2020, nèg ak zam itilize gwo ponyèt ak vyolans epi fòse manm SOFA kite tè a.  Se tè gouvènman ayisyen an te bay yo dwa pou yo menm sèlman itilize li. Plizyè manm SOFA te resevwa anpil kou anba men yo.  SOFA te aprann genyen yon konpayi ki nan Agwo-endistri ki rele Stevia Agro Industries S.A., ki t aprevandike li genyen tit pwopriyete pou tèren an pou yo kiltive ‘stevia’ pou voye vann lòtbò. Gouvènman ayisyen an te anile dwa li te bay SOFA a pou itilize tè a, san okenn pwosedi jidisyè, epi nan kòmansman ane 2021 an, ansyen Prezidan Jovenel Moïse, ki te la alepòk, fè tè a tounen yon zòn franch agwo-endistriyèl atravè yon dekrè egzekitif.

“Minis Agrikilti a mete tèt li nan plas jij pou pran pozisyon pou Stevia Industries epi pèmèt li kontinye aktivite yo pandan SOFA te resevwa lòd pou li kanpe sou aktivite pa li yo,”daprè Marie Frantz Joachim, ki se manm kòdinasyon nasyonal SOFA.

Nan dokiman enstitisyon yo te depoze a, yo souliye jan dappiyanp sou tè a agrave vyolasyon dwa yo. Sa agrave povrete a ak ensekirite alimantè nan zòn nan, epi fanm k ap chèche travay pou Stevia Industries yo ap fè fas ak esplwatasyon seksyèl epi ak moun ki vòlè salè yo. Dappiyanp sou tè vyole tou dwa pou abitan yo jwenn dlo, nan yon kontèks kote kriz klimatik la ap vin pi mal: nan 8600 ekta tè yo sezi yo pou pwodiksyon stevia a, genyen twa (3) rezèv dlo leta pwoteje.

“Nou pèdi rezèv dlo nou yo paske yo vin [pou konpayi] a kounya. Pandan tan sa a, nou ap viv yon gwo kriz dlo,”se deklarasyon Esther Jolissaint, ki se yon manm SOFA ki afekte nan Savane Diane.

Chanjman klimatik, dappiyanp sou tè ak vyolans kont fanm se plizyè fenomèn ki makonnen youn ak lòt, daprè sa enstitisyon yo fè konnen. Yo toujou rekonèt Ayiti kòm youn nan senk (5) peyi ki pi afekte akoz kriz klimatik la. Dappiyanp sou tè se petèt alafwa rezilta vilnerabilite klimatik la ak ensifizans resous yo, menm jan tou dappiyanp sou tè a kapab agrave vilnerabilite klimatik la, paske tè agrikòl vin pi ra chak jou pi plis pandan y ap itilize yo pou fè monokilti oubyen pou lòt aktivite endistriyèl ki ap degrade anviwònman an. Fanm yo pi ekspoze nan sitiyasyon sa.

“Dwa pou fanm nan zòn riral yo jwenn tè ak resous agrikòl se yon bagay ki fondamantal pou garanti dwa yo genyen kòm moun, epi sipòte rezilyans klimatik la,” daprè Sienna Merope-Synge, ki se Ko-Direktris Inisyativ Jistis Klimatik nan Karayib la nan GJC. Yo dwe rekonèt dappiyanp sou tè ki fèt kont fanm kòm yon fòm vyolans kont fanm,” selon sa li kontinye pou li di.

Dokiman sa a ki depoze nan tèt kole ant enstitisyon yo, konsantre li sou apèl SOFA lanse pou genyen reparasyon ak restitisyon pou fanm ki afekte akoz dappiyanp tè sa. Li prezante tou apèl SOFA ak mouvman sosyal Ayisyen yo lanse pou genyen pi gwo pwoteksyon sou dwa pou peyizan genyen tè, nan moman kominote riral yo ap fè fas ak ogmantasyon ka dappiyanp sou tè k ap fèt nan peyi a. Kominote entènasyonal la dwe panche plis sou pwoblèm nan epi denonse li, daprè sa enstitisyon yo fè konnen. “Nou ap mande solidarite bò kote lòt moun ki angaje yo nan batay mondyal ki genyen pou garanti respè dwa moun,” daprè sa Aurelien fini pou li di.

Pòs sa a te pibliye kòm yon lage laprès sou 5 avril 2022.

Pòs sa a reflete deklarasyon Global Justice Clinic la epi li pa nesesèman opinyon NYU, NYU Law, oswa Center for Human Rights and Global Justice.

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April 5, 2022 Youssef Farhat Uncategorized  

Acaparamiento De Tierras En Haití Viola Los Derechos De Las Mujeres Y Profundiza La Crisis Climática, Explican Grupos De Derechos

CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT

Acaparamiento De Tierras En Haití Viola Los Derechos De Las Mujeres Y Profundiza La Crisis Climática, Explican Grupos De Derechos

La sumisión de la Clínica de Justicia Global de NYU y Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn a la Relatora Especial de la ONU sobre la violencia contra la mujer subraya las consecuencias del acaparamiento violento de tierras contra las mujeres en Savane Diane, Haití 

English | Kreyòl

Un acaparamiento violenta de tierras desplazó a mujeres agricultoras en Savane Diane, Haití y constituyó violencia de género y ha agravado la vulnerabilidad a los cambios de clima, según la sumisión que la Clínica de Justicia Global de NYU y Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn (SOFA) le presentaron a la Relatora Especial de la ONU sobre la violencia contra la mujer tarde la semana pasada. El acaparamiento de tierra en Savane Diane, el cual le quitó tierra usada por SOFA para educar a mujeres en técnicas agrícolas más ecológicamente sostenibles, es sólo uno de varios ejemplos de tal acaparamiento en los últimos meses. Acaparamientos de tierra están aumentando en Haití, mientras el poder judicial haitiano no ha respondido.

“Solicitamos la atención de la Relatora Especial porque no hemos podido garantizar la justicia en Haití,” dijo Sharma Aurelien, la directora ejecutiva de SOFA. “Esta tierra ayudó a las mujeres a combatir la pobreza y benefició a toda la sociedad,” ella continuó.

En 2020, hombres armados violentamente echaron a los miembros de SOFA de las tierras sobre cuales el gobierno haitiano les había otorgado derechos exclusivos de uso. En el proceso, golpearon brutalmente a algunos. Desde ese entonces, SOFA se ha enterado que la empresa agroindustrial, Stevia Agroindustrias S.A., estaba reclamando título del área para cultivar stevia para exportación. El gobierno haitiano revocó los derechos de SOFA a la tierra, sin ningún proceso judicial, y, en principios del 2021, el difunto presidente, Jovenel Moïse, convirtió la tierra en una zona franca agroindustrial por decreto ejecutivo.

“El Ministro de Agricultura asumió el papel de juez, apoyando a Industrias Stevia y permitiendo que continúen con sus actividades mientras que SOFA fue ordenada a suspender las nuestras,” dijo Marie Frantz Joachim, miembro del comité coordinadora.

La sumisión de las organizaciones enfatizó la violación de los derechos conjuntos ocasionada por la apropiación de la tierra. Esto está profundizando la pobreza e inseguridad alimenticia en la zona, y las mujeres que trabajan con las Industrias Stevia han sufrido explotación sexual y robo de salarios. El acaparamiento también vulnera el derecho al agua durante esta misma crisis climática: los terrenos incautados incluyen tres reservorios de agua protegidos por el Estado.

“Perdimos nuestras reservas de agua porque ya le pertenecen a [la compañía]. Mientras tanto, estamos sufriendo una gran crisis de agua,” dijo Esther Jolissaint, miembro de SOFA afectado en Savane Diane.

El cambio climático, el acaparamiento de tierras, y la violencia contra las mujeres son fenómenos interconectados, explican las organizaciones. Haití frecuentemente está listado como uno de los cinco países más afectados por el cambio climático. El acaparamiento de tierras puede resultar de la vulnerabilidad climática, y también puede contribuir a ella, ya que las tierras agrícolas, cada vez más escasas, se convierten en monocultivos agrícolas que degraden el medio ambiente. Las mujeres son particularmente vulnerables.

“Los derechos a la tierra de las mujeres rurales y el acceso a los recursos agrícolas son esenciales para garantizar sus derechos humanos y apoyar la resiliencia climática,” dijo Sienna Merope-Synge, la codirectora de la Iniciativa de Justicia Climática del Caribe de la Clínica de Justicia Global. “El acaparamiento de tierras contra las mujeres debería ser reconocido como una forma de violencia de género,” ella continuó.

La sumisión conjunta enfatiza el llamado de SOFA por reparaciones y restitución para las mujeres afectadas por el acaparamiento de tierras. También destaca el llamado de SOFA y movimientos sociales haitianos para una mayor protección de los derechos de los campesinos a la tierra, ya que las comunidades rurales en Haití han notado un aumento en el acaparamiento de sus tierras. Las organizaciones explican que se necesita más atención y condenación internacional. “Estamos pidiendo la solidaridad de otros comprometidos en la lucha mundial por el respeto de los derechos humanos,” concluyó Aurelien.

Este post fue publicado originalmente como un comunicado de prensa abril 5, 2022.

Este post refleja la declaración de la Global Justice Clinic, y no necesariamente las opiniones de NYU, NYU Law, o de el Center for Human Rights and Global Justice.

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April 5, 2022 Youssef Farhat Uncategorized  

Chosen by a Secret Algorithm: Colombia’s top-down pandemic payments

TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Chosen by a Secret Algorithm: Colombia’s top-down pandemic payments

The Colombian government was applauded for delivering payments to 2.9 million people in just 2 weeks during the pandemic, thanks to a big-data-driven approach. But this new approach represents a fundamental change in social policy which shifts away from political participation and from a notion of rights.

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On Wednesday, November 24, 2021, the Digital Welfare State and Human Rights Project hosted the ninth episode in the Transformer States conversation series on Digital Government and Human Rights, in an event entitled: “Chosen by a secret algorithm: A closer look at Colombia’s Pandemic Payments.” Christiaan van Veen and Victoria Adelmant had a conversation with Joan López, Researcher at the Global Data Justice Initiative and at Colombian NGO Fundación Karisma about Colombia’s pandemic payments and its reliance on data-driven technologies and prediction. This blog highlights some core issues related to taking a top-down, data-driven approach to social protection.

From expert interviews to a top-down approach

The System of Possible Beneficiaries of Social Programs (SISBEN in Spanish) was created to assist in the targeting of social programs in Colombia. This system classifies the Colombian population along a spectrum of vulnerability through the collection of information about households, including health data, family composition, access to social programs, financial information, and earnings. This data is collected through nationwide interviews conducted by experts. Beneficiaries are then rated on a scale of 1 to 100, with 0 as the least prosperous and 100 as the most prosperous, through a simple algorithm. SISBEN therefore aims to identify and rank “the poorest of the poor.” This centralized classification system is used by 19 different social programs to determine eligibility: each social program chooses its own cut-off score between 1 and 100 as a threshold for eligibility.

But in 2016, the National Development Office – the Colombian entity in charge of SISBEN – changed the calculation used to determine the profile of the poorest. It introduced a new and secret algorithm which would create a profile based on predicted income generation capacity. Experts collecting data for SISBEN through interviews had previously looked at the realities of people’s conditions: if a person had access to basic services such as water, sanitation, education, health and/or employment, the person was not deemed poor. But the new system sought instead to create detailed profiles about what a person could earn, rather than what a person has. This approach sought, through modelling, to predict households’ situation, rather than to document beneficiaries’ realities.

A new approach to social policy

During the pandemic, the government launched a new system of payments called the Ingreso Solidario (meaning “solidarity income”). This system would provide monthly payments to people who were not covered by any other existing social program that relied on SISBEN; the ultimate goal of Ingreso Solidario was to send money to 2.9 million people who needed assistance due to the crisis caused by COVID-19. The Ingreso Solidario was, in some ways, very effective. People did not have to apply for this program: if they were selected as eligible, they would automatically receive a payment. Many people received the money immediately into their bank accounts, and payments were made very rapidly, within just a few weeks. Moreover, the Ingreso Solidario was an unconditional transfer and did not condition the receipt of the money to the fulfillment of certain requirements.

But the Ingreso Solidario was based on a new approach to social policy, driven by technology and data sharing. The Government entered agreements with private companies, including Experian and Transunion, to access their databases. Agreements were also made between different government agencies and departments. Through data-sharing arrangements across 34 public and private databases, the government cross- checked the information provided in the interviews with information in dozens of databases to find inconsistencies and exclude anyone deemed not to require social assistance. In relying on cross-checking databases to “find” people who are in need, this approach depends heavily on enormous data collection, and it increases government’s reliance on the private sector.

The implications of this new approach

This new approach to social policy, as implemented through the Ingreso Solidario, has fundamental implications. First, this system is difficult to challenge. The algorithm used to profile vulnerability, to predict income generating capacity, and to assign a score to people living in poverty, is confidential. The Government consistently argued that disclosing information about the algorithm would lead to a macroeconomic crisis because if people knew how the system worked, they would try to cheat the system. Additionally, SISBEN has been normalized. Though there are many other ways that eligibility for social programs could be assessed, the public accepts it as natural and inevitable that the government has taken this arbitrary approach reliant on numerical scoring and predictions. Due to this normalization, combined with the lack of transparency, this new approach to determining eligibility for social programs has therefore not been contested.

Second, in adopting an approach which relies on cross-checking and analyzing data, the Ingreso Solidario is designed to avoid any contestation in the design and implementation of the algorithm. This is a thoroughly technocratic endeavor. The idea is to use databases and avoid going to, and working with, the communities. The government was, in Joan’s words, “trying to control everything from a distance” to “avoid having political discussions about who should be eligible.” There were no discussions and negotiations between the citizens and the Government to jointly address the challenges of using this technology to target poor people. Decisions about who the extra 2.9 million beneficiaries should be were taken unilaterally from above. As Joan argued, this was intentional: “The mindset of avoiding political discussion is clearly part of the idea of Ingreso Solidario.”

Third, because people were unaware that they were going to receive money, those who received a payment felt like they had won the lottery. Thus, as Joan argued, people saw this money not “as an entitlement, but just as a gift that this person was lucky to get.” This therefore represents a shift away from a conception of assistance as something we are entitled to by right. But in re-centering the notion of rights, we are reminded of the importance of taking human rights seriously when analyzing and redesigning these kinds of systems. Joan noted that we need to move away from an approach of deciding what poverty is from above, and instead move towards working with communities. We must use fundamental rights as guidance in designing a system that will provide support to those in poverty in an open, transparent, and participatory manner which does not seek to bypass political discussion.

María Beatriz Jiménez, LLM program, NYU School of Law with research focus on digital rights. She previously worked for the Colombian government in the Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies and the Ministry of Trade.

https://vimeo.com/51589652
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December 14, 2021 Youssef Farhat Event Summary  

The Climate Fight Needs Imagination—Using the Tariff Act of 1930 to Fight Climate Change

CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT

The Climate Fight Needs Imagination-Using the Tariff Act of 1930 to Fight Climate Change 

The Human Rights and Climate Change movement should make use of less conspicuous tools, like the administrative agency, and forms of exploitation as a way of targeting corporations in the climate change fight.

Flags of various countries including U.S., Lebanon among others.
Vladislav Kapin (unsplash)

It is well-known that a handful of corporations are responsible for most of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. And yet the private sector marches forward flaunting an insignia of impunity, due to slow adaptability by legal frameworks coupled with its diligent resistance. Practitioners and advocates across the world are therefore hard at work concocting creative ways to bring a scintilla of accountability to such actors. One of the most powerful results of such efforts has been the rights turn that climate litigation has taken, in which claimants use human rights arguments to hold governments and corporations accountable for their egregious climate change actions.

This emerging human rights & climate change (HRCC) field is transcending traditional means of targeting corporations (like tort law, liability, and criminal law) and is sure to expand its reach to corporate actors with breakthrough decisions like Milieudefensie et al v Royal Dutch Shell. For the first time, a corporation was held responsible for lowering its greenhouse gas emissions. Despite this, corporations continue to be secondary duty-bearers under international law and human rights obligations. They, in other words, continue to be fugitive.

This means that the HRCC movement must keep using its imagination. It should recognize the power of seemingly minor legal interventions and the use of less-shiny tools like the administrative agency. It should also be attentive to other forms of exploitation that are inherently—but not so obviously—linked to climate change, as targeting these can provide another avenue for climate change action. And we need all the help we can get.

What is 19 U.S.C. § 1307?

Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1307) prohibits the importation into the US of any goods made “wholly or in part” using forced, indentured, or convict labor in any part of the world. Once a petition is filed, the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) conducts an investigation to determine whether to issue a Withhold Release Order (WRO) to prevent imports from entering the country.

What does 19 U.S.C. § 1307 have to do with climate change?

The business model of outsourcing lower-value activities throughout “supply chains” spanning countries with wide-ranging (think: weak) legal systems and human rights practices is at the core of value creation for multinational corporations. Indeed, the agriculture, food, garment, mining and extraction industries, to name a few, get more bang for the buck when using the labor of more than 24 million modern slaves. 19 U.S.C. § 1307 is designed to target this problem by closing the door on forced-labor products.

The lack of transparency that allows corporations to exploit and perpetuate modern slavery has also given them a green light to indulge in environmental attacks. Indeed, those individuals who perform forced labor often work for industries with the most egregious climate change impacts. Yet the inexistent recognition of 19 U.S.C. § 1307 as a tool for climate accountability points to a conceptual gap in advocacy—a lack of consideration for the nexus between modern slavery, environmental degradation, and climate change.

Let’s take the Brazilian beef industry as an example. As the world’s principal beef exporting country, Brazil exported a total of US$7.3 billion in beef in 2019 alone—equivalent to 21% of global beef exports. Brazilian civil society, the ILO, the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, the US Department of State and the Congressional Research Service, among other institutions, have evidence that the industry is sustained by rampant forced labor. Indeed, over half of all rescues of forced labor victims between 1995 and 2020 took place in the livestock sector. The crime is often accompanied by environmental offences, as the cattle ranch workers are themselves hired to clear native forests for pasture.

Uncoincidentally, the region with the highest incidence of slave labor in Brazil is the northern “deforestation arch,” including the Amazon Forest which is plagued by weak regulation. Between 2003 and 2014, over 21,000 workers were rescued from forced labor in the Amazon region alone, about 70% in the cattle raising sector. It is no secret that deforestation obliterates the Amazon’s ability to save humanity.

So, who is behind the monstrous Brazilian beef industry? JBS, Marfrig, and Minerva. Together, they are responsible for two-thirds of all Brazilian beef exports and account for over 40% of the Amazon rainforest’s slaughter capacity. The US is the fifth largest importer of Brazilian beef, importing 2.84% of all Brazilian exports, importing 56% of all Brazilian unprocessed beef exports between February and July 2020 alone. And it doesn’t stop there. Cattle raising in the Amazon has increased more than tenfold over the last 40 years. The US Department of Agriculture projects that Brazil’s export market share will reach 23% of global beef exports by 2028. With this impending storm, using the readily available 19 U.S.C. § 1307 as one of multiple tools to deter and bring awareness to both the human and climate grievances taking place in the Amazon Forest should be a no-brainer.

Why else use 19 U.S.C. § 1307?

There are many other reasons why advocates should take advantage of 19 U.S.C. § 1307:

  1. Its reawakening: The statute laid dormant since its inception in 1930 due to its “consumptive demand exception” that largely swallowed the rule. After the Obama administration eliminated the exception in 2015, there has been a considerable uptick in the issuance of WROs. Between March 2016 and June 2021, the CBP issued almost 30 WROs, standing in stark contrast to the 33 WROs total issued from 1930 to 2015. This is part of a broader willingness by the current administration to use trade enforcement to tackle forced labor—an issue that has generally garnished wide bipartisan support. With this political momentum, now is the right time to act.
  2. A Low Evidentiary Standard: If the CBP Commissioner finds at any time that information available reasonably, but not conclusively, indicates that merchandise violating 19 U.S.C. § 1307 is being, or is likely to be, imported into the US, then a WRO may be issued. This evidentiary threshold is much lower than that applicable to criminal statutes, like the TVPA, and makes this remedy quite accessible. Thus, even if courts deny a finding of forced labor in a specific case, there is hope that the CBP issues a WRO.
  3. A Heavy Burden Shift to the Corporation: Once a WRO is put in place, the burden of proof shifts to the company in question to provide evidence, in ninety days, that the goods in question were not produced with forced labor or that it has remediated all of the 11 ILO indicators of forced labor. It is rare—has only happened twice—for a company to meet this high burden. So once a WRO is put in place, it is likely to stay in place.
  4. Modeled After a Progressive Definition: The definition of forced labor used by 19 U.S.C. § 1307 was modeled after the ILO Convention’s definition. ILO instruments have therefore informed US approaches to forced labor, with the CBP explicitly referencing ILO standards in each WRO press statement issued in 2019. This is good news for practitioners, as ILO standards are progressive and recognize a wide range of behaviors as forced labor. US governmental bodies have recently called for the CBP to further promote alignment with ILO standards.
  5. Accessible: While collecting evidence of forced labor may be daunting, the WRO petition submission process is straightforward and free of cost. This saves petitioners from resource drainage and the painfully slow timeframe of taking corporations to court. In addition, it allows petitioners to surpass the litigation tactics of corporate giants, including filing for bankruptcy, demanding stays, and launching sanctions motions against plaintiffs’ counsel.

Even if not explicitly tied to climate, WROs have already been successfully issued against corporations, like those in the palm oil and mining industries. Using our imagination to take advantage of readily available tools, like 19 U.S.C. § 1307, to build a holistic climate movement that covers all its bases is the least we can do for our planet.

August 17, 2021. Melina De Bona, The Earth Rights Research & Action (TERRA Law).

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August 17, 2021 Youssef Farhat Post  

Enough Symbolism, We Need Real Climate Action: Why We Shouldn’t Let Governments Hide Behind Symbolic Climate Emergency Declarations

CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT

Enough Symbolism, We Need Real Climate Action: Why We Shouldn’t Let Governments Hide Behind Symbolic Climate Emergency Declarations

Though symbolic climate emergency declarations can helpfully shape the narrative around climate change, advocates shouldn’t let them be used to mask government failures to take material action to combat the climate crisis.

Duncan Shaffer (unsplash)

The dawn of a new administration raises hopes among climate activists that the U.S. government may finally take the urgent action needed to avert climate catastrophe. High-profile climate advocates have recently called on Joe Biden to be the “climate president.” As part of this effort to push Biden on climate change, some–including Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer–have argued that the president should treat climate change like an emergency by declaring a climate emergency and, potentially, using the emergency powers afforded the executive to take bold actions on climate change.

What would that look like? Would it materially advance climate action? Experiences around the world on climate emergency declarations offer an answer: it depends.

A handful of countries and hundreds of municipalities, cities, and towns worldwide have declared a climate emergency, and those numbers continue to increase. Countries that have issued climate emergency declarations include: New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada, Bangladesh, and Argentina. Municipalities and cities likewise include: Sydney, Australia; New York City; Bogotá, Colombia; and South Chungcheong, South Korea. For some observers, this is an outstanding trend. The picture, however, is complicated upon further inspection and assessment of what these climate emergency declarations actually do.

While some of these climate emergency declarations are paired with material policy commitments and programs, overwhelmingly, these declarations are only symbolic. Although it’s important to shift the discourse on climate change so that its urgency garners more mainstream recognition, with less than ten years left to put humanity on track to avoid climate disaster, it just isn’t enough.

Below, we take a look at the climate emergency declaration trend and what it means for the new U.S. president.

What Is a Climate Emergency?

A climate emergency declaration is a resolution or piece of legislation passed by a governing body that recognizes climate change as an emergency and, generally, voices support for action commensurate with treating climate change as an emergency. The first climate emergency declaration was passed in 2016 in Darebin, Australia and hundreds of emergency declarations have been issued since.

Generally, climate emergency declarations tend to be non-binding resolutions. They may also be imbedded in larger climate legislation. If they are stand-alone resolutions, then they may be followed by additional climate legislation or policy commitments aimed at further reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

The content of the declarations varies, but they all label climate change as an “emergency.” They generally include expressions of support for mobilizations of resources, particularly on a massive scale. Indeed, one of the goals of Climate Mobilization, an organization leading the climate movement push for emergency declarations, is to build political will using emergency declarations for WWII-level resource mobilization in the fight against climate change. Many declarations also support efforts to reach carbon neutrality by 2030 or some other year in the near- to medium-term future. 

So, What Have Climate Emergency Declarations Actually Achieved?

Undeniably, climate emergency declarations have helped shift the discourse around climate change to better reflect the gravity and the urgency of the situation. This shift in the framing of climate change–from a problem that could be gradually addressed to one that requires immediate and profound action–is a goal of the climate advocates working to advance these declarations. Advocates argue that declaring climate emergencies can help trigger a “fundamental departure from [the] ‘normal’ mode of functioning” by waking people up to the existential threat posed by climate change. In other words, declaring a climate emergency can help shift people from functioning in a “business as usual” mode to a “climate emergency” mode by “telling the truth” about the nature of the climate threat.

Climate emergency declarations overwhelmingly, however, fall short of advancing material action on climate change. The climate emergency declarations issued by the United Kingdom, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Spain, and  Argentina, for example, are non-binding insofar as they do not require the government to take any particular action on climate change. Moreover, the vast majority of these declarations have been issued by local governments, which typically don’t have the emergency powers that federal governments do. Even in places where climate emergency declarations are paired with substantive policies, like in  New Zealand, the policy itself may not be sufficient nor actually reflect, in material terms, the characterization of climate change as an emergency. In other words, though political leaders are employing “emergency” rhetoric, they are failing to match that rhetoric with the substantive action that we would expect to see governments take in emergency situations. Though these political leaders are “declaring” climate change as an “emergency,” they are not invoking the emergency procedures and powers permitted under law that are used in other emergency situations, such as natural disasters and war.

Why It Matters that These Declarations Are Generally Non-Binding and Symbolic in Nature

Though climate emergency declarations clearly help communicate the dangers of climate change, they also provide cover for political leaders who want to play the role of a “climate leader” without taking the tangible action necessary to actually lead on climate change.

Take Canada, for example. In 2019, the Canadian House of Commons passed a non-binding resolution expressing the legislative chamber’s view that climate change is indeed an emergency and requires a response requisite with its characterization as such. However, the very next day, the Trudeau administration approved a controversial pipeline expansion. The fact that the Canadian government can pay lip service to climate action through a non-binding resolution while at the same time advancing policies that undermine climate mitigation highlights the core limitations of climate emergency declarations as they have been designed thus far. Not all governments demonstrate inconsistency on climate change as extreme as this, but the effect is similar. Climate emergency declarations, which are overwhelmingly symbolic, allow political leaders to paint themselves as being serious on climate change without making actual commitments or taking any concrete actions to stem the climate crisis.  

What Does All of This Mean for the United States?

The point is: we must not settle for symbolic performances in lieu of the ambitious material climate action that is so desperately needed.

Instead, let’s continue to push President Biden to be the climate president and treat climate change like the emergency it is. After all, this is one of the last presidencies that can still undertake ambitious actions to avoid locking in climate wreckage in the coming decades. But, given the stakes, let’s not give this administration–nor any government–the opportunity to hide behind symbolic performances. That means pushing Biden to make hard, substantive commitments on climate change, including the use of the constitutional and legal powers afforded the president during emergencies, so that climate action doesn’t continue to languish in a Congress, still home to far too many climate deniers and climate minimizers.

July 6, 2021. Jacqueline Gallant, The Earth Rights Research & Action (TERRA Law).

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July 6, 2021 Youssef Farhat Post  

Public Transport, Private Profit: The Human Cost of Privatizing Buses in the United Kingdom

INEQUALITIES

Public Transport, Private Profit: The Human Cost of Privatizing Buses in the United Kingdom

The Human Rights and Privatization Project launched a report on the deregulation of local buses in the United Kingdom in July 2021. 

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The report finds that the government’s 1985 decision to privatize and deregulate the bus sector in England (outside London), Scotland, and Wales has failed passengers and undermined their rights. Taxpayers are subsidizing corporate profits, while private operators are providing a service that is expensive, unreliable, and often dysfunctional. Fares have skyrocketed while ridership has plummeted, undermining efforts to reduce greenhouse emissions. This approach has also significantly impacted individual’s lives and rights. We found that people have lost jobs and benefits, faced barriers to healthcare, been forced to give up on education, sacrificed food and utilities, and been cut off from friends and family. The government’s new strategy for England leaves this deregulated system in place, and does not address its structural shortcomings. 

The report finds that running a bus service premised on profit and market competition, rather than on the well-being of the public, leads to violations of people’s rights and is incompatible with human rights law. It calls for public control of bus transport as the default approach, which would be more cost-effective and allow for reinvestment of profits, integrated networks, more efficient coverage, simpler fares, consistency with climate goals, and public accountability. Given the importance of public transport on access to essential services and rights, it also calls for a statutory minimum level of service frequency.

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July 1, 2021 Youssef Farhat Uncategorized